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Humane Punishment for Seriously Disordered Offenders: Sentencing
Departures and Judicial Control over Conditions of Confinement
E. Lea Johnston *
Abstract
At sentencing, a judge may foresee that an individual with a major mental
disorder will experience serious psychological or physical harm in prison. In light
of this reality and offenders’ other potential vulnerabilities, a number of
jurisdictions currently allow judges to treat undue offender hardship as a
mitigating factor at sentencing. In these jurisdictions, vulnerability to harm may
militate toward an order of probation or a reduced term of confinement. Since
these measures do not affect offenders’ day-to-day experience in confinement,
these expressions of mitigation fail to protect adequately those vulnerable
offenders who must serve time in prison. This Article argues that judges should
possess the authority to tailor the conditions of vulnerable, disordered offenders’
carceral sentences to ensure that sentences are humane, proportionate, and
appropriate for serving the intended aims of punishment. To equalize, at least in
part, conditions of confinement for this population, judges should consider
ordering timely and periodic mental health evaluations by qualified professionals,
disqualifying facilities with insufficient mental health or protective resources,
specifying the facility or unit where an offender will serve or begin his sentence,
and mandating certain treatment in prison. Allowing judges to exercise power
over correctional conditions in this way will allow judges to fulfill better their
institutional function of meting out appropriate, humane, and proportionate
punishments, subject prison conditions to public scrutiny and debate, and help
reform the image and reality of the criminal justice system for some of society’s
most vulnerable individuals.
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Introduction
Prisons are overwhelmed with inmates with schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and other serious mental illnesses, who are ill-equipped to navigate these
dangerous environments. 1 Some individuals, because of their major mental

1

Experts estimate that around 16% of prisoners have a mental disorder. See Kenneth Adams
& Joseph Ferrandino, Managing Mentally Ill Inmates in Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 913,
913 (2008) (“Although specific estimates vary depending on the research methodology and
definition of mental illness used, the proportion of mentally ill prison inmates is generally
estimated to be around 16%, based on mental health service records.”) (internal citations omitted);
MORRIS L. THIGPEN ET AL., EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES (National Institute of
Corrections 2004), available at http://nicic.gov/Library/018604 (discussing studies). This rate
exceeds the incidence of mental disorder within the community. See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E.
GLAZE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 3 (Bureau of Justice Statistics
2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (reporting that about 11%
of persons age 18 or older in the U.S. general population satisfy DSM-IV criteria for symptoms of
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disorders and other vulnerabilities, 2 will experience serious psychological and
physical harm when imprisoned, and judges can anticipate these harms at
sentencing. 3 The hazards faced by seriously disordered inmates are numerous and
substantial. Correctional officials may fail to detect an inmate’s disorder 4 or treat
it effectively. 5 Typically housed within the general prison population, inmates
with major mental disorders are especially likely to suffer physical and sexual
victimization.6 For disciplinary or protective reasons, correctional officials are
disproportionately likely to transfer disordered inmates to solitary confinement, 7

a mental health disorder). Since male prisoners constitute 93% of the prisoner population in the
United States, this Article will focus on male prisoners. See Heather C. West, et al., Prisoners in
2009, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf.
2
The focus of this Article is on individuals with serious mental illnesses who receive
sentences of imprisonment. A defendant’s mental disorder may not be his only source of
vulnerability to serious harm in prison, however. See infra notes 6 & 151. Any additional sources
of vulnerability should also factor into a sentencing calculus to ensure that sentences are humane,
proportionate, and serve other intended aims of punishment.
3
See, e.g., United States v. Boutot, 480 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419, 421 (D. Me. 2007) (granting a
downward departure because the court was “concerned about the impact that serving a prison term
with the general inmate population would have” on the defendant, who was prone to mental
decomposition when not adequately treated); United States v. Roach, No. 00 CR 411, 2005 WL
2035653, at *6-8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2005) (finding “that[,] absent continuing and appropriate
psychotherapy, [the defendant] will be placed at significant risk of a relapse to serious depression,
placing her at risk of suicide . . . ,” and thus reducing the defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) to allow for treatment); United States v. Ribot, 97 F. Supp. 2d 74, 84 (D. Mass. 1999)
(granting a downward departure, under U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.3 and 5K2.13, in part because “sending
[the defendant] to prison would aggravate his major depressive disorder with potentially life
threatening consequences” and emphasizing the defendant’s twenty-five year struggle with
depression and prior suicide attempt); People v. Zung, 531 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615-16 (N.Y. App. Div.
1988) (substituting the punishment of imprisonment for community service in part because
“uncontroverted medical documents indicate that a period of incarceration would be severely
detrimental to this defendant's mental health, and could possibly exacerbate his suicidal
tendencies”); People v. Jackson, Nos. 282708, 284430, 2009 WL 1361956, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.
May 14, 2009) (upholding the lower court’s reduction of the defendant’s sentence based, in part,
on “her suicidal ideations”).
4
See infra notes 41-54 and associated text.
5
See infra notes 73-131 and associated text.
6
See infra note 93. Additional risk factors may also place individuals at heightened risk.
Other risk factors for sexual abuse within correctional facilities include physical or developmental
disability; youth; diminutive size; a history of victimization; first, nonviolent, or sexual offender
status; and perception as gay, bisexual, transgender, or gender-nonconforming. See Section
115.41, Docket No. OAG–131 (signed May 16, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115),
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_final_rule.pdf (identifying risk factors for sexual assault
in prison); see also NATIONAL RAPE ELIMINATION COMMITTEE REPORT 7-8, 69-74 (June 2009),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf (discussing risk factors).
7
See infra note 95.
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where they often experience serious psychological deterioration and acute
distress. 8 The occurrence of these foreseeable harms threatens to undermine the
intended purposes of an offender’s punishment and render his sentence
disproportionate or even inhumane.
Cognizant of this reality, a number of jurisdictions allow a judge to depart
from a presumptive sentence when an offender would face excessive or undue
hardship in prison. 9 Some states allow a finding of likely hardship to support a
stayed sentence of incarceration with probation, 10 while other jurisdictions allow
a judge to reduce the duration of an offender’s term of confinement on this
basis. 11 These measures, in effect, allow courts to impose different penalties on
offenders in order to achieve punishments of similar punitive bite. 12 These
practices expose jurisdictions to charges of undermining the value of parity in
punishment for equally blameworthy offenders and the reliability of the
sentencing process. Further, these efforts do not provide adequate relief for those
offenders who do not qualify for probation, despite their substantial risks of
serious harm if incarcerated. Thus, the efforts of states and the federal government
to date, while laudable, are at best incomplete.
Responsive to these concerns, an alternative means of recognizing
vulnerability would be to provide the same basic punishment to vulnerable
defendants as to standard offenders, but in a form designed to remove the
unacceptable hardships that flow from an offender’s disability. To accomplish this
objective, a judge could order the term of incarceration established by the
legislature as the deserved penalty for a given offense, but then attach certain
conditions to help ensure that the prison experience of the vulnerable offender
will match in severity that of a standard offender. Unfortunately, judges currently
lack the means to condition the carceral sentences of vulnerable offenders in this
way.
This Article proposes an expansion of judicial authority to protect
vulnerable offenders with serious mental illnesses and to effectuate the legitimate
aims of punishment. In particular, the Article urges legislatures to authorize

8

See infra note 96.
Specific authorization is most critical in jurisdictions that channel or limit judges’ discretion
at sentencing. About half of all states employ indeterminate sentencing schemes that allow for
wide judicial discretion, while remaining jurisdictions limit judges’ abilities to vary sentences
according to offender characteristics through sentencing guidelines or a statutory determinate
sentencing regime. See Kevin R. Reitz. The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and
Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1102-03 (2005).
10
See infra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text.
12
See E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of Sentencing and Mental
Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 145, 216-21 (2013).
9
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judges to ameliorate unacceptably high risks of serious harm to seriously
disordered offenders by tailoring individual sentences of confinement. 13 With this
power, a judge, through a sentencing order, could positively intervene in a
seriously disordered offender’s prison experience at two crucial junctures. First, a
judge could ensure that an inmate receives a comprehensive mental health
evaluation by a qualified mental health professional at intake. This would increase
the probability that correctional officials would recognize an offender’s mental
disorder and provide necessary treatment. Second, a judge could include
restrictions within an offender’s sentence to reduce the likelihood of the inmate’s
degeneration or victimization in prison. These conditions could include
disqualifying sites of confinement that lack certain mental health resources,
barring disciplinary options known to exacerbate mental disorder, or requiring an
inmate to start his sentence in an available residential treatment unit. These
interventions not only would potentially safeguard vulnerable, seriously
disordered offenders but also would allow judges better to achieve their key
objective of meting out appropriate, humane punishments for individuals’
criminal offenses.
Critically, this Article limits its attention to defendants with Axis I mental
disorders. 14 Many other risk factors exist and merit recognition, 15 but major
mental disorders pose unique difficulties within prisons. First, individuals with
serious mental illnesses face the specific threat of loss of cognitive function,
which—because it implicates a defendant’s hold on reality, personality, and
autonomy—is a particularly acute interest. Second, mental disorder is often hard
to diagnose, and the nature of the screening system employed at prison intake
centers means that some individuals’ disorders will be overlooked, leading to a

13

Sentencing constitutes one of those “zones of twilight” in which the distribution of power
between the separate branches of government overlaps and is uncertain. See Jordan Fried, The
Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission: An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 704, 712-13 (1989) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637 (1952)); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989)
(“Historically, federal sentencing—the function of determining the scope and extent of
punishment—never has been thought to be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive
jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of Government. Congress, of course, has the power
to fix the sentence for a federal crime, and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a
sentence is subject to congressional control.”).
14
Axis I disorders, as defined by the American Psychiatric Association, include clinical
syndromes such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression, as well as chronic brain
diseases that cause extreme distress and interfere with social and emotional adjustment. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS XXIV 1324, 28 (4th ed. rev. 2000) (“DSM-IV-TR”). In this paper, serious mental illness, major mental
illness, major mental disorder, and Axis I disorder are used interchangeably.
15
See supra note 6 (detailing risk factors).
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delay in treatment and placement in an unsuitable environment. 16 Other
vulnerabilities, such as diminutive stature, physical disability, or first-offender
status, may be easier to identify (and harder to feign). 17 Third, prisons commonly
protect offenders vulnerable to abuse by placing them in protective custody or
solitary confinement, though most mental health experts and some courts agree
that confining offenders with serious mental illnesses in these conditions poses a
strong likelihood of severe psychological damage. 18 To the extent that isolation is
used for safeguard, prisons may lack a means of protecting vulnerable offenders
with major mental disorders in a way that does not further endanger their health.
Finally, insofar as the inadequate care and treatment of prisoners with serious
mental disorders originates from a lack of information about the presence of
disorder and benign neglect in prisons, judges may be able to compensate
partially for these deficiencies through sentencing.
To be clear, this Article does not advocate for judges to assume
responsibility for evaluating and placing mentally ill inmates or for a diminution
of correctional responsibility in these areas. Indeed, prisons are well positioned
for, and should accelerate their progress in, developing and implementing
objective, verified, reliable classification procedures and humane housing and
treatment options for mentally ill offenders. 19 Rather, the Article merely examines
whether a judge—when he finds that an offender with a serious mental disorder
must be incarcerated for his criminal offense but is concerned that incarceration
poses an unacceptable risk of serious harm to that offender—should be authorized
to shape the offender’s sentence to minimize its harmful potential.
This Article is organized in seven parts. Part II identifies the potential
perils that await an offender with serious mental illnesses in prison, including
shortcomings in the processes designed to detect offenders’ mental disorders and
provide protective and therapeutic housing. Recognizing that correctional
agencies rightfully consider offender vulnerability at multiple stages in the
classification process, Part III defends the premise that vulnerability is also a
legitimate source of concern for sentencing judges in order to effectuate various
aims of punishment. Part IV details jurisdictions’ current approaches to
recognizing undue hardship in sentencing and explains why these approaches are
inadequate for those vulnerable offenders who must be imprisoned, given the
nature of their crimes or their criminal histories. Part V explores the extent to
which judges’ findings of mental disorder could prevent offenders’ disorders from
slipping undetected through the prison admission process. In this way, judges’

16

See infra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
This observation does not apply to all vulnerabilities to serious harm in prison, such as gay
or bisexual orientation. See supra note 6.
18
See infra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
19
See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
17

7

HUMANE PUNISHMENT
*DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
MAY 3, 2013

sentencing orders could assume a functionality similar to the controversial guilty
but mentally ill verdicts available in some states. Finally, Part VI draws from
existing state experience to investigate possible conditions that judges could
attach to the sentences of seriously disordered offenders in order to render
vulnerable offenders’ sentences more proportionate and humane. These
conditions could include disqualifying facilities particularly likely to exacerbate
an individual’s disorder, designating facilities with certain treatment or protective
options, and mandating that offenders receive—or not receive—certain treatment
in prison.
II.

Identification and Treatment of Serious Mental Illnesses in Prison
Prison is physically and psychologically hazardous for inmates with major
mental disorders. Recognizing the constitutional imperative to identify and treat
these offenders, 20 the vast majority of prisons have established procedures to
detect serious mental health issues at intake and factor an inmate’s mental health
needs into his facility and housing placements. Shortcomings exist in the current
assessment and classification systems, however, that lead to the under-detection
of mental disorder and unpredictable placement in protective housing. In addition,
the protective housing options afforded by many prisons can actually exacerbate
mental disorder. The following sections offer a study and critique of the processes
in place to screen individuals for mental illnesses, and the treatment and housing
options available in prisons for vulnerable and mentally disordered prisoners.
A.
Mental Health Screen
Prisons rely on a triage system to identify offenders with mental disorders
who require treatment and special housing. 21 The initial mental health screen—
sometimes the only assessment of an inmate’s mental health—is typically part of
the prison intake process. 22 The aims of this screen are to detect individuals with
severe mental disorders who need immediate psychiatric attention, prevent

20

See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
See ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE
PRISONS, 2000 1-2, 5 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=788; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS,
PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 2 (2001), available at
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/016724.pdf; Humberto Temporini, Conducting Mental Health
Assessments in Correctional Settings, in HANDBOOK OF CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH 119,
129-39 (Charles L. Scott, ed., 2d ed. 2010).
22
See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 2. For a detailed treatment of the variety of
approaches to the intake process employed by state correctional agencies, see PATRICIA L.
HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS: ASSESSING NEEDS AND CLASSIFYING PRISONERS
(Nat’l Institute of Corrections 2004), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019033.pdf [hereinafter
HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS].
21
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suicide, continue individuals’ psychotropic medications, and identify individuals
with non-acute mental health needs that require further assessment and
treatment. 23 In addition, the results of the mental health screen inform an inmate’s
classification, housing, job assignments, programming, and treatment. 24 The
screen typically consists of a short interview regarding an inmate’s current
symptoms, past psychiatric history, suicide potential, social history, and
educational history. 25 It also may involve a review of available records and the
administration of specialized instruments or tests. 26
If the evaluator believes an inmate is likely to have one or more
psychiatric disorders, he will refer the inmate to a mental health professional for
further evaluation and testing. 27 This “second-level triage” 28 should, according to
guidelines issued by the American Psychiatric Association, take place within 72
hours of referral and consist of a “brief mental health assessment” tailored to “the
particular, suspected level of services needed.” 29 Finally, for inmates with serious
treatment needs, a psychiatrist or other appropriately credentialed mental health
professional should perform a comprehensive mental health evaluation within a
time frame appropriate to the level of urgency. 30 This thorough evaluation
consists of a face-to-face interview and a review of health care records and
collateral information. 31 It usually concludes with a diagnostic formulation and an
initial treatment plan. 32

23

See Temporini, supra note 21, at 130, 135.
HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 10-11.
25
Id. at 10; Temporini, supra note 21, at 135.
26
See THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14; HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS,
supra note 22, at 10 (“Generally, the screen consists of a brief interview by mental health staff.
Depending on the results, the mental health staff may complete one or more psychological tests,
such as the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI), and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS).”).
27
Temporini, supra note 21, at 135-36; THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14 (“A more
elaborate and comprehensive evaluation or assessment should take place for those identified by
the screening process as likely to have one or more psychiatric disorders.”); NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 2 (“Inmates identified as needing additional mental health
assessment are then referred to psychologists, psychiatrists, or a mental health team for a further
evaluation of their needs and assignment to housing and services.”); HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER
INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 10.
28
Temporini, supra note 21, at 139.
29
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS 4344 (2d ed. 2000).
30
Id. at 44.
31
Id.
32
Id.
24
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While inmates who screen positive for mental disorder will receive
additional assessment, few safety nets exist for those assessed as having no
cognizable mental health problem at the initial screening point. Human rights
advocates report, “In many prisons, there is no routine monitoring of [the] mental
health of prisoners who are not on [the] mental health caseload, even when the
prisoners are in notoriously stressful settings such as segregation that can prompt
mental health crises.” 33 Legal commentators have urged prisons to conduct a
subsequent screen to catch inmates whose disorders are not detected or who
develop mental health problems during the course of their confinement, 34 but
prisons typically do not conduct a second screen for all inmates. 35 Rather, prisons
rely on post-classification referral to detect mental health disorders that manifest
after admission. 36 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the referral process is
woefully deficient, 37 however, as seriously ill inmates will often not self-report38
and correctional officers tend to misinterpret symptomatic illness as disorderly
conduct and report only inmates who pose security threats. 39 “As a consequence,”

33

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 102 (2003).
34
See Bonnie J. Sultan, The Insanity of Incarceration and the Maddening Reentry Process: A
Call for Change and Justice for Males with Mental Illness in United States Prisons, 13 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 357, 374 (2006) (“[A]ll [persons currently incarcerated] should be
reevaluated at a later date during their incarceration, since mental illness can develop inside
prison.”).
35
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 101 (“Prisoners with mental illness are not
identified upon entry into prison and are left untreated.”); infra note 36.
36
See Temporini, supra note 21, at 137-38; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra
note 21, at 137-38 (describing the process of post-classification referral).
37
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 101 (warning that the current system
fails to identify and treat in a timely manner prisoners who develop mental disorders after
admission); Richard L. Elliott, Evaluating the Quality of Correctional Mental Health Services: An
Approach to Surveying a Correctional Mental Health System, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 427, 435
(1997) (identifying a number of elderly prisoners with serious, persistent mental illness who had
not been diagnosed as such and were not currently receiving mental health treatment).
38
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“While mentally competent
inmates can be relied upon to self-report most medical ailments, mentally ill prisoners may not
seek out help where the nature of their mental illness makes them unable to recognize their illness
or ask for assistance.”).
39
See W. David Ball, Mentally Ill Prisoners in the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation: Strategies for Improving Treatment and Reducing Recidivism, 24 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 16-17 (2007); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 75-76 (relaying
officers’ disclosure that mental health referrals would often be made for disruptive, but not merely
bizarre, behavior); Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 396 (2006) (“Officers typically do not understand the nature of
mental illness and its behavioral impact. They cannot distinguish—and may not even know a
distinction exists—between a frustrated or disgruntled inmate who ‘acts out’ and one whose

10

HUMANE PUNISHMENT
*DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
MAY 3, 2013

one court observed, “custody staff essentially make medical judgments that
should be reserved for clinicians, and some inmates are not given appropriate
early treatment that could prevent or alleviate a severe psychiatric disorder.” 40
B.
Shortcomings in Initial Screening Procedure
Multiple shortcomings mar correctional agencies’ mental health screening
processes. Some deficiencies involve failures in implementation, while other
problems are structural in nature.
First, while the vast majority of prison facilities report administering
mental health screens within a day of admission, 41 they may not do so in a
comprehensive manner or under conditions likely to generate accurate results. For
instance, in Coleman v. Wilson, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California found, “The [mental health screening] mechanisms on which [the
California Department of Corrections] rely are either used haphazardly, or depend
for efficacy on incomplete or non-existent medical records, self-reporting, or the
observations of custodial staff inadequately trained in the signs and symptoms of
mental illness.” 42 The court concluded: “The evidence before the court plainly
shows that thousands of inmates suffering from mental illness are either
undetected, untreated, or both.” 43 Despite the existence of a court order to
improve the assessment process, 44 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California found in 2005 that “the reception center intake process . . . fails to

‘acting out’ reflects mental illness. They assume misconduct is volitional or manipulative.”);
Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 169-74.
40
Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1219.
41
See JAMES AUSTIN & KENNETH MCGINNIS, CLASSIFICATION OF HIGH-RISK AND SPECIAL
MANAGEMENT PRISONERS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICES 45 (Nat’l Institute
of Corrections 2004), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/019468.pdf (Exhibit 16) (Showing that 100%
of responding states screened male inmates for suicide risk and psychotic and mood disorders at
the initial assessment while 84% do so for personality disorders); HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER
INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 10 (Exhibit 3. Major Components of the Intake Process:
National Review Results) (reporting survey results showing that a mental health screen within 24
hours of an inmate’s admission is mandatory in 74% of state intake facilities, and that 98% of all
state correctional facilities conduct such screenings within this time frame); see also BECK &
MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 2 (documenting that 95% of state prison systems reported “that
they either screened inmates or conducted psychiatric evaluations to determine inmate mental
health or emotional status”). The Bureau of Justice Statistics found that maximum and medium
security facilities were more likely than minimum security facilities to screen inmates at intake
and conduct psychiatric assessments. See id. at 2 (Table 2) (finding that minimum security
facilities conducted psychiatric assessments 62% of the time, compared to 84% at medium
security facilities, and 88% at maximum security facilities).
42
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1306 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
43
Id.
44
See id. at 1323-24.

11

HUMANE PUNISHMENT
*DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
MAY 3, 2013

adequately identify and treat the health care problems of new prisoners.” 45 The
court found that intake evaluators typically administered health screens in less
than half the amount of time deemed adequate (seven minutes, instead of
fifteen). 46 Perhaps more egregious, screeners sometimes assessed inmates in
groups, without regard to confidentiality or inmates’ unwillingness to share
sensitive information in this setting. 47
Second, the quality of screening instruments varies among facilities,48
which can result in a low detection rate of inmates with serious mental illnesses.49
Federal reports warn that prison facilities may utilize tests that are not
comprehensive, have not been verified, and have not been tested on representative
prisoner populations. 50 A 2007 report by the U.S. Department of Justice’s
National Institute of Justice observed that “screening procedures are highly
variable[:] they may consist of anything from one or two questions about previous
treatment to a detailed, structured mental status examination.” 51 Studies show that
the brief screening tests developed specifically for correctional settings fail to
detect one out of every four offenders with a previous undetected mental
disorder. 52 The use of other tests may yield less impressive results, with tragic

45

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-01351, 2005 WL 2932253 at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2005). For an analysis of this case and deficiencies in California prisons’ assessment processes,
see Ball, supra note 39, at 7-9.
46
Plata, 2005 WL at *12. This case assessed the constitutional sufficiency of all health
screens conducted at California prisons, not just those assessments pertaining to mental health.
47
Id. at *13.
48
See THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14 (“Most prison authorities acknowledge the wisdom
and legal necessity of screening and assessing inmates for mental health disorders. Determining
how to screen and the methods to use remains challenging.”).
49
See infra notes 52-54; cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 101 (“If the screening
questionnaire is adequate and properly administered, such personnel will probably have a fairly
good rate of referring intake prisoners for more in-depth evaluations.”). I would submit that a
“fairly good rate” of detection is not adequate when prisons do not offer a second routine
screening and the consequences of failing to detect mental disorder within a prison environment
are so dire.
50
HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 14 (“Many states have
validated their custody assessment instruments for their inmate populations. However, risk and
needs assessment processes in some states lack such verification. They are not comprehensive nor
have they been tested on prisoner populations typical of the agency. These assessments need to be
expanded and validated to confirm their appropriateness for systematically evaluating both male
and female prisoners.”).
51
JULIAN FORD ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH SCREENS FOR CORRECTIONS 1-2 (Nat’l Institute of
Justice 2007), http://www.nij.gov/pubs-sum/216152.htm.
52
Temporini, supra note 21, at 132 (citing studies showing that the Correctional Mental
Health Screen and the Brief Jail Mental Health Screen are around 75% effective at accurately
detecting individuals with previously undetected mental disorder). During these tests, a
correctional officer will look for current signs of mental illness and ask eight to twelve questions
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consequences. In one study involving jail inmates, for instance, “fully 63% of
inmates who were found to have acute mental symptoms through independently
administered testing were missed by routine screening performed by jail staff”
and remained untreated. 53 Among state prisoners, a 2006 Bureau of Justice
Statistics report found that 66% of state prisoners and 76% of federal prisoners
with mental health problems had not received any form of mental health treatment
since admission to prison, presumably at least partially a result of failures in
detection through screening. 54
Third, limitations inherent in the assessment process inhibit evaluators’
ability to detect accurately inmates with mental health needs. Most fundamentally,
initial mental health assessments may rely almost exclusively on information
communicated by the inmate to the evaluating professional, either verbally or
through his behavior. 55 Inmates with serious mental disorders may decide not
to—or may be unable to—communicate accurate information about their mental
health history or status. Many inmates are aware that individuals who manifest
bizarre thoughts or behavior may face adverse consequences, such as being placed
on suicide watch, sent to administrative lockdown, forcibly administered
medication, or preyed upon by other inmates. 56 In addition, an inmate’s mental

concerning symptomatology and prior mental health treatment. See id. at 130-35 (describing the
booking mental health screen and including questions included in common correctional tests); see
also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 29, at 40-41 (describing the screening’s
components and objectives).
53
JULIAN FORD ET AL., supra note 51, at 2 (discussing Linda A. Teplin, Detecting Disorder:
The Treatment of Mental Illness Among Jail Detainees, 58 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 233 (1990)); see also Robert L. Trestman, et al., Current and Lifetime Psychiatric
Illness Among Inmates Not Identified as Acutely Mentally Ill at Intake in Connecticut's Jails, 35 J.
AM ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 490, 495-46 (2007) (“In general, the number of inmates with current
and lifetime psychiatric illness who were not identified as acutely mentally ill at jail intake was
high . . . . More than two of three inmates met the criteria for at least one lifetime psychiatric
disorder, almost half for an anxiety disorder, and more than one-third for an affective disorder,
substantially higher levels than those reported in community prevalence studies.”).
54
See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 1, at 9 (reporting that, while “[a]ll Federal prisons and
most State prisons . . . , as a matter of policy, provide mental health services to inmates, including
screening inmates at intake for mental health problems, providing therapy or counseling by trained
mental health professionals, and distributing psychotropic medication,” only 34% of state
prisoners and 24% of federal prisoners who had a mental health problem received mental health
treatment after admission).
55
See Ball, supra note 39, at 8 (observing that mental health screens in California prisons
“fail to incorporate objective factors alongside self-reporting; since inmates with acute mental
illness are often unable to communicate their symptoms or diagnoses, self-reporting alone cannot
adequately determine which prisoners are mentally ill”).
56
THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14-15 (“An inmate’s outward expression of bizarre
thoughts or behavior or any loss of control may result in being put on suicide watch, being given
medication, or being sent to administrative lockdown. In addition, prison inmates often exploit and
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illness, low intelligence, mental retardation, or lack of verbal skills may hinder his
ability to communicate his symptoms effectively. 57 Moreover, inmates may be
without psychiatric medication necessary to enable ordered thought or effective
communication so may be unable to remember or communicate relevant
information. Experts have warned that, when an inmate cannot adequately convey
his thoughts or feelings, evaluators may misinterpret his difficulty as intentional
malingering or an attempt to be manipulative. 58 Also, anosognosia, or refusal to
acknowledge one’s disorder, 59 is a common symptom of some serious mental
illnesses, 60 and inmates may go to great lengths to hide their illnesses as a
manifestation of their disorders. 61 Finally, co-occurring substance abuse
disorders, head injuries, and developmental disorders can complicate diagnoses
and treatment. 62
In this setting, accurate detection of mental disorder may depend upon an
evaluator’s level of training. However, mental health professionals with extensive
training in assessment and diagnosis, such as psychologists and psychiatrists,

take advantage of other inmates’ weaknesses. As a result, inmates may fail to report their
symptoms, and considerable time may pass before an inmate’s mental illness is discovered and
diagnosed.”).
57
See Ball, supra note 39, at 8; THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 15.
58
THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 (“Prison staff must exercise great caution in interpreting
what is malingering or manipulative behavior. . . . An inmate’s inability to think abstractly and
lack of verbal skills may inhibit his or her ability to put common symptoms and feelings into
words that adequately convey a sense of what is happening. Such inmates may be thought to be
malingering when they cannot explain what they are feeling.”).
59
VESNA MILDNER, THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION 253 (2008)
(defining anosognosia as “[i]nability or refusal to acknowledge suffering from an illness or
disorder”).
60
Brendan McLean, The Difficulty in Seeing Your Own Illness, NATIONAL ALLIANCE ON
MENTAL
ILLNESS
E-ADVOCATE
(March
2011),
http://www.nami.org/ADVTemplate.cfm?Section=20111&Template=/ContentManagement/Conte
ntDisplay.cfm&ContentID=118505 (“Anosognosia can occur in any mental illness, regardless of
its severity, although, it is more common to occur in cases of serious mental illness. It is more
commonly found in schizophrenia, where approximately 60% of individuals diagnosed do not
believe they have a mental illness, than in bipolar disorder or major depressive disorder.”); E.
FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE TO TREAT THE MENTALLY
ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 112 (2012) (noting that “approximately half of all individuals with
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are aware of their illness. The other half, however, have
impaired awareness of their illness.”).
61
Anosognosia Keeps Patients From Realizing They’re Ill, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 7, 2001,
at 12-32, available at http://journals.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=103404
(noting that “[p]eople will come up with “illogical and even bizarre explanations for symptoms
and life circumstances stemming from their illness . . . along with a compulsion to prove to others
that they are not ill”); THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5 (noting “many adults with serious mental
illness go to great lengths to hide their illness from staff or other inmates”).
62
See THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
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rarely conduct mental health screenings. Instead, the screens are often performed
more cheaply—and perhaps less effectively 63—by nurses, counselors, or social
workers. 64 Some institutions even rely upon correctional staff to perform mental
health screens. 65 According to a 2004 report by the National Institute of
Corrections,
Mental health professionals who want to work in prisons are in short
supply and are generally used to provide treatment, consultation, and
training rather than screening. The result is that prison staff, sometimes
with limited training, must distinguish on a daily basis inmates who are
experiencing symptoms of a serious mental illness from those who are
malingering or experiencing adjustment disorders. 66
While correctional staff may feel confident in their abilities to detect overtly
psychotic symptoms such as auditory or visual hallucinations, clear delusions, or
incoherent speech, they “are considerably more uncertain about identifying less
obvious—although equally serious—signs and symptoms of anxiety and
depression.” 67 It is also possible that correctional officials’ tendencies to misread
symptomatic behavior as willful and manipulative could shade their
assessments. 68
Finally, intake evaluators often lack access to existing records or reports
that could provide a more accurate picture of an inmate’s mental health status.
Evaluators often do not have the results of prior psychiatric evaluations, even
those conducted in connection with a competency examination, insanity
proceeding, or pre-trial detention. 69 An inmate usually does not bring medication

63

Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The [medical technical
assistants] who briefly screen incoming inmates typically do not have the necessary training and
background to recognize psychiatric illnesses.”).
64
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 3 (“In many agencies and
institutions, intake screening is a multi-stage process in which the initial screening is done by nonpsychologists, including nurses, counselors, physicians, or social workers.”).
65
See infra note 66; BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 1 (finding, from the 2000 census
of state adult correctional facilities, that 78% of state confinement facilities screened at intake, and
79% of state correctional facilities conducted psychiatric assessments).
66
THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14.
67
JULIAN FORD ET AL., supra note 51, at 4.
68
See supra note 39.
69
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 101 (“Unfortunately, staff conducting the initial
screening as well as more comprehensive examinations usually do not possess the results of prior
psychiatric assessments, even assessments made during the prisoner’s pre-trial incarceration or
psychiatric diagnoses undertaken as part of trial competency or insanity defense proceedings. Such
prior psychiatric workups may, indeed, never make it to the prison.”).
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containers or a copy of his medical records or prescriptions to the diagnostic
center. 70 In addition, mental health screens are often uninformed by jail
evaluation and treatment records, even though state law may require that these
records accompany an inmate upon transfer. 71 An evaluator may even complete
an offender’s initial assessment and classification without the benefit of the
court’s presentence report. 72 Without such data, screeners must rely on inmates’
willingness and ability to share information about past and current mental health
symptoms and treatment. As a result, inmates’ mental disorders can go
undetected.
Even when inmates’ disorders are detected, however, prisons often fail to
provide the treatment and protective environment necessary to prevent prisoners
with serious mental disorders from experiencing serious harm in prison.
C.
Treatment, Housing, and Vulnerability
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Estelle v. Gamble that prisoners
have an Eighth Amendment right to reasonably adequate medical care. 73
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, circuit courts of
appeals have extended this principle to psychiatric and psychological care. 74 In

70

See Ball, supra note 39, at 7 (“Diagnoses, prescriptions, and medications often fail to
accompany prisoners at intake.”); Temporini, supra note 21, at 133-34 (noting the “more
common” inmate who reports taking psychiatric medication but lacks documentation to this
effect).
71
See Ball, supra note 39, at 7 (“County jails are required by California law to evaluate
mental health of prisoners, but very few of these records are transferred from jails to state prison
system, forcing prison reception centers to administer redundant tests.”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 33, at 1 (“If they are identified after screening and placed on mental health
caseloads, prison data management systems often are inadequate to track services provided, or to
ensure that the prisoners’ records follow them when they are transferred to different prisons.”).
72
HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 13 (“Information
typically contained in a presentence investigation report is critical to conducting a comprehensive
and complete initial assessment. . . . Ideally, this information arrives at the intake facility with the
prisoner or shortly thereafter. Many states reported, however, that these data are not received in a
timely manner and sometimes arrive after the prisoner has been transferred from the intake facility
to another prison.”).
73
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment.” (internal citation omitted)); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep’t
of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (“[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of
its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at
the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”).
74
See Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that an inmate is
“entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider,
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Ruiz v. Estelle, the District Court of Texas outlined a set of six guidelines that
correctional institutions must meet to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. 75 These
minimum requirements include a systematic screening and evaluation program to
identify inmates who require mental health treatment, treatment beyond
segregation or close supervision, the employment of a sufficient number of
trained mental health professionals to provide individualized treatment, accurate
and confidential record-keeping, proper administration of medications, and
identification and treatment of inmates at risk of suicide. 76 Multiple courts and
organizations have embraced the Ruiz criteria as the standard for constitutionally
adequate mental health care in correctional settings. 77
Prisons generally apply the principle of least eligibility, deliberately
maintaining the level of health care a step below the services provided by the
government outside of prison. 78 Under this principle, “the level of prison
conditions should always compare unfavorably to the material living standards of
the laboring poor,” 79 because prisoners “are the least eligible or least deserving
members of society for any free benefit from the government,” 80 including mental
health care. Given its cost, older psychiatric medications—often with a greater
host of side effects and lower rates of medication compliance than newer

exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medical
certainty (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such
disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to
the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial.”).
75
See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
76
Id. at 1339. The court also held, in reference to inmates with mental retardation, that
“[t]hose whose needs are more specialized or complex than average inmates may not be denied
their eighth amendment rights to adequate living conditions, protections from physical harm, and
medical treatment by being forced to fit into a mold constructed for persons of average
intelligence and physical mobility.” Id. at 1345. In this way, the court recognized a duty to provide
disabled inmates with accommodations to ensure that their conditions of incarceration match as
closely as possible those afforded to non-disabled inmates. T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic
Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 325
(1997).
77
See Fred Cohen, Legal Issues and the Mentally Disordered Inmate, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF CORRECTIONS, SOURCE BOOK ON THE MENTALLY DISORDERED PRISONER 32, 48 (1985); Kim
P. Turner, Raising the Bars: A Comparative Look at Treatment Standards for Mentally Ill
Prisoners in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, 16 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
409, 424 & n. 66 (2008).
78
FRANK SCHMALLEGER & JOHN ORTIZ SMYKLA, CORRECTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 205
(2001).
79
Richard Sparks, Penal “Austerity:” The Doctrine of Less Eligibility Reborn?, in PRISONS
2000 74, 74 (R. Matthews & P. Francis, eds. 1996).
80
Brandon K. Applegate, Penal Austerity: Perceived Utility, Desert, and Public Attitudes
Toward Prison Amenities, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 253, 256 (2001).
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medications—are the treatment modality of choice inside prisons. 81 In addition,
while the vast majority of prisons report providing some form of psychotherapy or
counseling, 82 prisons must restrict their distribution of this expensive service, 83
and many inmates do not receive the therapy that they need to cope effectively
within the prison environment. 84
The default rule followed by many state correctional agencies, as well as
the federal Bureau of Prisons, is to house inmates with major mental disorders
with the general prison population at the appropriate security level. 85 Inspired by
the ideals epitomized in the Community Mental Health Centers Act 86 and
Americans with Disabilities Act, 87 these jurisdictions have adopted a philosophy
of “mainstreaming” inmates with serious mental illnesses. 88 Theoretically, this

81

See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 115-17 (detailing the limited access to newer
medications within some prison systems); id. at 121-25 (examining the side effects of older
antipsychotic medications and some prisons’ failure to monitor side effects appropriately); Adams
& Ferrandino, supra note 1, at 922; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra note
21, at 4 (reporting that all 49 departments of corrections responding to the survey indicated
treating mentally ill inmates with psychotropic medication).
82
See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 2 (Table 1) (reporting that 84% of state adult
confinement facilities provide therapy).
83
See NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 4-5 (reporting that 14
departments of corrections (DOCs) typically provide inmates with non-acute mental illnesses with
less than 1 hour per week of counseling, 10 DOCs typically provide these inmates 1 hour of
counseling per week, 4 DOCs provide more than 1 hour of counseling per week, and 9 DOCs
indicated that provision of therapy varies by need).
84
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 109-114 (detailing the limited provision of
therapeutic interventions in many prison systems); MacKain & Messer, infra note 120, at 89
(observing that “few inmates receive care beyond the prescriptions of medication or assignments
to separate housing”).
85
See BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 1, 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at
128. For instance, approximately 80% of prisoners with a mental disorder live in the general
population in Ohio. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 128. Correctional officials
designate these inmates as “special management” and may distinguish them through distinct
outfits. IRA J. SILVERMAN & MANUEL VEGA, CORRECTIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 230 (1996).
86
Community Mental Health Centers Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2689 et seq. (1963).
87
See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
88
See Fellner, Corrections Quandary, supra note 39, at 394 (“Apart from the mental health
services that may or may not be provided, prisons typically treat prisoners with mental illness
identically to all other inmates. There are no special allowances. Officials confine them in the
same facilities, expect them to follow the same routines, and require them to comply with the same
rules.”); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, P.S. 5310.13, Institution Management of Mentally Ill Inmates §
6, at 3 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1995), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5310_013.pdf
(“To ensure consistent treatment throughout the system, each institution shall develop a
comprehensive approach for managing mentally ill inmates which emphasizes the management of

18

HUMANE PUNISHMENT
*DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
MAY 3, 2013

housing arrangement could facilitate equality of opportunity, full participation in
programs, and independent living for disordered individuals. 89 Since the
“mainstream” prison environment is antitherapeutic, however, this approach has
received its share of criticism. 90
Confinement with the general prison population can be seriously
damaging for an individual with a major mental disorder. 91 As a preliminary
matter, this high-stress environment exacerbates the symptoms of many serious
mental illnesses and can cause degeneration. 92 Moreover, recent studies
demonstrate that individuals with serious mental illnesses, unable sufficiently to
assess danger and modify their behavior to ward off attacks, are more prone to
physical and sexual victimization than non-disordered individuals. 93 In addition,
strict conformance with prison rules can be very difficult for individuals with

these cases in a regular correctional setting, rather than in a hospitalized setting, as the preferred
treatment strategy whenever and wherever feasible.”) .
89
See Judy Anderson, Special Needs Offenders, in PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION:
PRACTICE AND THEORY 219, 220 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett, eds., 1999)
(discussing how mainstreaming disordered individuals assures the provision of services available
to the general prison population).
90
See, e.g., CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, MENTAL HEALTH IN THE HOUSE OF
CORRECTIONS
43
(2004),
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2004/06/Mental-Health.pdf (identifying “the overarching problem with the
provision of mental health care in New York State prisons [as] the attempt of [the Office of
Mental Health] to superimpose the community mental health model on the correctional system”
and arguing that this model is inapt because “in the correctional system . . . not only is outpatient
care sorely lacking in ‘the community’ of the general prison population, the violence and chaos of
prison life itself can destabilize even mentally balanced individuals”); Shelia M. B. Holton,
Managing and Treating Mentally Disordered Offenders in Jails and Prisons, in CORRECTIONAL
MENTAL HEALTH HANDBOOK 101, 109-10 (Thomas J. Fagan & Robert K. Ax, eds. 2003) (arguing
that mentally ill inmates in a mainstreamed environment are likely to isolate themselves through
withdrawal and enter the cycle of segregation); cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 133
(discussing why deinstitutionalization and the community mental health model are problematic in
the prison context).
91
See Marshall T. Bewley & Robert D. Morgan, A National Survey of Mental Health Services
Available to Offenders with Mental Illness: Who is Doing What?, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 351,
352 (2011) (“Simply stated, prison environments are not conducive to optimal mental health
functioning.”); Richard C. McCorkle, Gender, Psychopathology, and Institutional Behavior: A
Comparison of Male and Female Mentally Ill Prison Inmates, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. 53, 54 (1995)
(“For those with predispositions, the incarceration experience can actually trigger
psychopathology.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 53 (“Mental health experts have
described prisons as a ‘toxic’ environment for the seriously mentally ill.”).
92
See, e.g., Holton, supra note 90, at 108-110; Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections,
A Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisons as Facilities for the Mentally Ill, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 135,
140 (2006).
93
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 161-69 & nn.64-83 (physical assault) & 91103 (sexual assault).
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cognitive and behavioral limitations, and studies confirm that prisoners with
serious mental illnesses are more likely than non-disordered prisoners to violate
prison rules. 94 As a result, seriously ill prisoners are disproportionately punished
in solitary confinement, 95 where they are especially susceptible to
decompensation, psychotic breaks, and suicide ideation. 96 A 2004 report by a
state correctional agency concedes that “finding safe, humane, and non-punitive
methods for handling inmates who are experiencing the symptoms of mental
illness is an ongoing challenge for prison administrators.” 97
Identified as particularly vulnerable to attack, seriously disordered
offenders may be housed in isolation as a means of protection. Through a process
called external classification, correctional authorities, based largely on
information collected at intake, determine a prisoner’s custody level (minimum,
medium, or maximum) and his facility placement. 98 At a facility, correctional
officials typically undertake the process of internal classification, which
determines how an individual of a particular custody level should be housed and
the programming and resources he requires. 99 While aspects of inmate
classification have become increasingly objectified over time, 100 facilities have
long based protective custody decisions on the subjective judgments of
correctional officials. 101 Prison classification experts recognize that these

94

See id. at 170-74 nn.114-34.
See id. at 174-76 & nn.146-49. A 2004 report by the National Institute of Corrections
documented that 47% of states reported subjecting mentally ill inmates who are disruptive to the
same maximum-custody policies as non-disordered inmates. AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 41,
at 37.
96
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 176-78 & nn.150-55.
97
Adams & Ferrandino, supra note 1, at 914 (quoting Oregon Dept. of Corrections,
Managing Mental Illness in Prisons Task Force: Findings and Recommendations 45 (2004)).
98
AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 41, at 7.
99
See PATRICIA L. HARDYMAN, ET AL., INTERNAL PRISON CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS: CASE
STUDIES IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 1-2 (Department of Justice 2002).
100
See AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 41, at 1 (“Although most prison systems have
implemented objective classification systems that have proven effective in determining the
custody level assigned to an inmate designated for the general population, less attention has been
devoted to identifying inmates who should be placed in a special management category such as
administrative segregation or protective custody.”).
101
Id. at 7-8 (“Correctional administrators have long relied on professional clinical judgment
in assessing prisoners for . . . placement in administrative segregation or protective custody. This
method has been favored because it requires only a professional with the skill and experience
necessary for the assessment. In general, no forms must be completed and no tests for reliability
and validity are needed.”); NATIONAL RAPE ELIMINATION COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 76
(observing that “many” facilities rely on subjective assessments of inmates’ risk of sexual assault
and do not conduct targeted risk assessments.”); Ron Angelone, Protective Custody Inmates, in
PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION supra note 89, at 226, 229-31 (observing that “some prison
95
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subjective assessments may yield arbitrary determinations with tragic results.102
Ironically, those inmates fortunate enough to be removed from predators in the
general population may be confronted with a different, but equally significant,
danger when assigned to protective custody. In protective custody, inmates are
often housed in highly restrictive conditions that resemble those in disciplinary
isolation, 103 with isolation for twenty-one to twenty-four hours per day. 104

systems are examining internal institutional classification in order to address housing and security
needs such as protective custody” but ultimately concluding that “sophisticated statistical
prediction methods cannot be relied upon to ensure accurate identification of protective custody
inmates” and endorsing a subjective, discretion-based system). Some prisons employ a formal
internal classification process to govern interfacility decisions, but many do not. See HARDYMAN
ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 11 (“Most states do not use a formal internal
classification system that assigns prisoners to a housing unit, cell, program, or job.”).
102
See AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 41, at 7-8 (“Unfortunately, professional judgment has
been shown to be by far the least accurate risk assessment method. Too often, such judgments are
no more than ‘gut’ reactions that may vary from expert to expert with regard to the same
prisoner.” (internal citations omitted)); James Austin, External and Internal Classification, in
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS PRISON CLASSIFICATION PEER TRAINING AND STRATEGY
SESSION: WHAT’S HAPPENING WITH PRISON CLASSIFICATION SYSTEMS? SEPTEMBER 6 - 7, 2000
PROCEEDINGS 5, 7 (Feb. 15, 2001), http://nicic.gov/Library/016707 (“Currently, most prisons
systems have less structured internal classification systems which can often result in serious
incidents or high-profile escapes. Often, inmates are inappropriately housed, programmed or
improperly separated.”). Under the recently issued rule implementing the Prison Rape Elimination
Act, however, all inmates will need to be assessed, using an objective screening instrument, during
an intake screening for their risk of being sexually victimized by other inmates. See National
Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, § 115.4, Docket No. OAG–131 (signed
May
16,
2012)
(to
be
codified
at
28
C.F.R.
pt.
115),
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_final_rule.pdf. For a description of several actuarialbased risk assessment instruments, see AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 41, at 15-23.
103
See Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and ‘Supermax’
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 135 (2003) (“Conditions of confinement for
protective custody prisoners are in many ways similar to those in supermax confinement. That is,
they are typically segregated from the rest of the prison population, restricted or prohibited from
participating in prison programs and activities, and often housed indefinitely under what amount
to oppressive and isolated conditions.”); James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective
Custody: An Analysis of the Rights of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 91
(1987) (“In exchange for security, protection inmates often experience conditions of confinement
similar to those imposed as punishment for disciplinary infractions.”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS 31 (2001) (“Prisons and jails typically have a
protective custody classification for isolating and protecting prisoners believed likely to be
victimized by others. Prisoners assigned to this status are usually housed in separate areas of the
facility, in which conditions are often highly restrictive.”).
104
See Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1, 3-4 (2011) (stating that, due to the fact that gay men and trans women are “almost
automatically” targets for sexual abuse, many carceral facilities routinely house these inmates in
protective custody, “a classification that typically involves isolation in ‘a tiny cell for twenty-one
to twenty-four hours a day,’ the loss of access to any kind of programming (school, drug,
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Individuals with serious mental disorders often deteriorate in this restrictive
environment. 105
When a prisoner reaches a state of crisis or an acute state of mental illness,
prison authorities typically remove the prisoner from segregation or the general
population and transfer him to an acute crisis unit for inpatient mental health
services. 106 These units may reside within the prison, in a separate mental health
facility, or in a public or private hospital. 107 Stays in these units are temporary; the
goal is to treat and stabilize the inmate for return to the general population or,
perhaps, a residential treatment unit. 108 Criteria for admission match those
required for involuntary civil commitment, 109 and treatment resembles that
available in an inpatient psychiatric hospital, with significant psychotherapy and
pharmaceutical regimens. 110
In addition, some states house mentally ill inmates in separate units or
facilities on a longer term basis, especially when inmates cannot function
adequately or cope in the general population. 111 The most comprehensive report

treatment, etc.), and even deprivation of basics like ‘phone calls, showers, group religious
worship, and visitation’” (internal citations omitted)); Robertson, supra note 103, at 122 (noting
that inmates in protective custody spend twenty-two hours in isolation per day).
105
See supra note 96.
106
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 4-5 (identifying the following
“main criteria used to determine when mentally ill inmates are housed outside the general
population”: when an inmate requires inpatient care (22 DOCs); when an inmate is in crisis or
experience an acute state of mental illness (17 DOCs); when an inmate is severely impaired,
decompensating, or is becoming increasingly psychotic (14 DOCs); and when officials deem an
inmate to be dangerous or at risk of self-harm (11 DOCs and the Bureau of Prisons)); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 128; CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, supra note
90, at 41.
107
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 5.
108
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 128. For more information on residential
treatment units, or intermediate care facilities, see infra Part VI.B.1.
109
See, e.g., VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, OPERATING PROCEDURE: MENTAL
HEALTH
SERVICES:
LEVELS
OF
SERVICE
3
(2012),
available
at
http://www.vadoc.state.va.us/about/procedures/documents/700/730-3.pdf (stating that an inmate
may be committed to a crisis unit when “there exists a substantial likelihood that, as a result of the
mental illness, the offender will, in the near future [harm himself or others, or] lack capacity to
protect himself and provide for his basic needs”). In addition, less restrictive alternatives generally
must be deemed unsuitable.
110
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 128.
111
See THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8 (“Many prisons acknowledge the need for chronic
care programs or special needs housing units within the correctional setting for inmates with
chronic mental illness who do not require inpatient treatment but do require a therapeutic
environment due to their inability to function adequately within the general population.”); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 128 (“Prison mental health services typically includes at least
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on segregated housing to date, based on the 2000 Census of State and Federal
Adult Correctional Facilities, disclosed the existence of 155 facilities, in 47 states,
that provide mental health/psychiatric confinement as a special function.112
Facility administrators specified that mental health confinement was the primary
function of twelve facilities and the secondary function of 143 facilities. 113 While
some states restrict their use of special facilities to short-term housing for inmates
suffering from acute episodes, others report utilizing these facilities as long-term
segregated housing for inmates with mental disorders. 114
One increasingly popular option employed by correctional agencies
involves the use of intermediate care facilities or residential treatment units,
which are designed to assist mentally disordered inmates who are unable to
function adequately in the general population. These units provide prisoners, who
may stay in the units for varying amounts of time, 115 with effective clinical care
and the skills inmates need to cope effectively in the general prison population.

three general levels. . . . Sub-acute care is typically provided outside of hospital settings for
prisoners suffering from severe and chronic conditions that require intensive case management,
psychosocial interventions, crisis management, and psychopharmacology in a safe and contained
environment.”); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 5-6 (reporting that 16 of
49 responding jurisdictions indicated that a “main” reason for deciding when to house an inmate
with mental illness outside the general population included “when the inmate can’t function
adequately or cope in the general population,” and that a smaller (unspecified) number of
respondents indicated that separate housing would be appropriate “when the inmate needs
structure; when the [General Assessment Functioning score] drops under 50; when the inmate
needs help staying on medications; when the inmate becomes a management problem; when the
inmate is unable to care for him or herself; when the inmate is vulnerable; and when the inmate
needs more observation”).
112
BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 2; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 6-7 (conveying that 33 states, the Bureau of Prisons, Puerto Rico,
and Guam reported providing separate housing units for inmates with mental disorders in at least
one institution, including five states that provided “sheltered,” “supportive,” “partial care,” or
“assisted housing” for inmates with mental disorders; and eight DOCs reported providing
specialized facilities for prisoners with mental illnesses, which “may be used for all mentally ill
inmates or only those whose mental illness is most severe,” depending on the agency). According
to the report, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wyoming lacked a special psychiatric confinement
facility and confined inmates needing segregation in state hospitals, prison infirmaries, or special
needs units within general confinement facilities. BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 2.
113
BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 4.
114
Id. (“In some States these facilities are used to house mentally ill inmates separately from
the general population; in other States they are used to remove inmates in response to acute
episodes for a short term.”); see also Holton, supra note 90, at 115-16 (describing short- and longterm options employed by correctional systems to accommodate inmates with mental illnesses).
115
See infra note 257.
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No recent report catalogues all the states that maintain intermediate care units,116
but research reveals the existence of units in New York, 117 Washington,118
Ohio, 119 North Carolina, 120 Virginia, 121 Kansas, 122 New Mexico,123
Mississippi,124 Vermont, 125 Alabama, 126 California, 127 and Wyoming. 128 These
units are associated with lower levels of mental disorder, disciplinary violations,
and victimization, and may yield aggregate cost savings for prisons. 129 Given the
widely touted success of these units, other states may choose to emulate this
option, to the extent they have not done so already. 130 Intermediate care facilities
are detailed in Part VI.B.1 below.

116

See supra note 111; see also NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH
STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, vol. I xii & n.22 (2002),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/189735.pdf (reporting, based on a 1992 study, that only
36% of prisons have specialized housing for inmates with stable mental health conditions).
117
CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 35.
118
WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT SERVICES:
THERAPY
AND
MEDICINE
OFFER
NEW
LIVES
3
(2008),
http://www.doc.wa.gov/aboutdoc/docs/p351gmentalhealthtreatmentservicesfactsheet.pdf.
119
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT
UNITS
2
(2010)
[hereinafter
OHIO
DRC],
available
at
http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/drc_policies/documents/67-MNH-23.pdf (operating procedure).
120
Sally J. MacKain & Charles E. Messer, Ending the Inmate Shuffle: An Intermediate Care
Program for Inmates with a Chronic Mental Illness, 4 J. OF FORENSIC PYSCHOL. PRACTICE 87, 9192 (2004).
121
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 109, at 3, 5-6.
122
LARNED CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH FACILITY, KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.ks.gov/facilities/lcmhf (last visited Jan 26, 2013).
123
NEW MEXICO CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT CENTER:
PSYCHIATRY, MEDICAL, AND NURSING CARE 2, 4-7 (2012), available at
http://corrections.state.nm.us/policies/docs/CD-172300.pdf (operating procedure).
124
Terry A. Kupers et al., Beyond Supermax Administrative Segregation: Mississippi’s
Experience Rethinking Prison Classification and Creating Alternative Mental Health Programs,
36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1038 (2009).
125
VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS 2 (1997),
available at http://www.doc.state.vt.us/about/policies/rpd/correctional-services-301-550/361-370programs-treatment-programs/361.01.09%20Residential%20Tx%20Programs.pdf.
126
ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, TREATMENT PLANNING 4 (2010) (operating
procedure).
127
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 131.
128
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS & DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES, AN
EVALUATION: INMATE MENTAL HEALTH CARE
51-61
(2009),
available
at
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/09-4full.pdf (Wisconsin Resource Center).
129
See infra notes 259-268 and accompanying text.
130
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 130 (citing Dr. Jeffrey Metzner as stating
that “Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, New York, Vermont, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Colorado, and
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In summary, although prisons have processes and resources in place to
identify, treat, and protect offenders with serious mental illnesses, these
mechanisms do not guarantee that a prison will recognize an individual’s mental
disorder or protect an individual in a given case. Mental health screenings have
structural limitations that impede evaluators’ abilities to detect accurately
individuals with major mental disorders. Moreover, internal classification
processes used to identify at-risk individuals often rely on subjective assessments
of vulnerability, so may yield arbitrary results. Equally important, the only longterm housing options available to seriously disordered individuals in a given
facility may include units in the general prison population, where disordered
individuals face a heightened risk of predation and often cannot cope effectively
with prison rules and stress, and isolation, which inmates with serious mental
illnesses are unlikely to tolerate well. All too often, prisoners with serious mental
disorders decompensate, are admitted to an inpatient facility until they stabilize,
and then are returned to the original restrictive or dangerous environment, where
the destructive cycle starts anew. 131
Judges could serve an important function in helping to identify seriously
disordered offenders at risk of serious harm in prison, and in crafting sentences to
ensure their appropriate penal bite and humanity. Before detailing potential
sentencing options, however, the next Part defends a central premise of this
Article: offender vulnerability is an appropriate consideration for sentencing, and
is not an issue that should be reserved for penal administrators.
III.

Legitimacy of Recognizing Vulnerability to Harm at Sentencing
Allowing judges to modify a seriously disordered offender’s sentence in
light of his vulnerability to serious harm would allow judges better to fulfill their
institutional function and achieve the aims of punishment. The sentencing judge is
charged with selecting and conveying the type and length of sentence warranted
by an offender’s crime, within limits established by the legislative branch. 132 A
sanction that is appropriate for an offender without disability may be wholly

Kansas have all taken steps towards creating networks of sub-acute care facilities”). Correctional
agencies do not employ consistent terminology for these units, so it can be difficult to discern the
long- or short-term nature of mental health units included in government reports. See NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 21, at 6 (listing ways in which mental health units may be
characterized).
131
See Fellner, Corrections Quandary, supra note 39, at 404; MacKain & Messer, supra note
120, at 88 (describing this phenomenon).
132
The U.S. Constitution did not assign the sentencing power to one branch of government,
and all three branches may properly play a role in sentencing. See Kieran Riley, Trial By
Legislature: Why Statutory Mandatory Minimum Sentences Violate the Separation of Powers
Doctrine, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 285, 302 (2010); supra note 13.
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excessive, criminogenic, or even inhumane for an offender lacking the cognitive
or behavioral capabilities necessary to cope within a given punitive environment.
Consideration of the aims of punishment allows the identification of possible
theoretical justifications for considering an offender’s vulnerability to harm at
sentencing. Though additional justifications may exist, 133 consideration of
vulnerability to serious harm in prison may be critical to effectuating retributive
or rehabilitative goals.
A.
Retributive Rationales
Two retributive rationales support a judge’s tailoring of an offender’s
sentence based on his likely hardship or injury in prison. The first justification, as
I have argued at length elsewhere, derives from a just deserts theory of retributive
punishment. 134 Under a just deserts approach, the severity of an offender’s
punishment should reflect the offender’s culpability and the harm that he
effectuated through his criminal act. 135 While most scholars measure a
punishment’s severity by reference to an objective standard, 136 some
commentators have recognized that sanctions such as incarceration have a
foreseeable, disparate impact on vulnerable classes of offenders, such as the
elderly, young, physically disabled, and mentally ill. 137 In response, scholars
including Professors Andrew Ashworth and Andrew von Hirsch have espoused a
principle of equal impact, which dictates that, “when an offender suffers from

133

A third potential justification, mercy, is not addressed in this Article.
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 183-229.
135
See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 4 (2005) (explaining that the desert rationale of proportionalist
sentencing underlying retributivism “rests on the idea that the penal sanction should fairly reflect
the degree of reprehensibleness (that is, the harmfulness and culpability) of the actor’s conduct”).
136
See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1619, 1658 &
n.195 (2010) (“Subjectivist critics’ claims to the contrary notwithstanding, retributivism defines
punishment as a restraint on liberty or other consequence that is determined and justified
objectively by reference to a culpable offense.”).
137
See, e.g., VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 135, at 4243, 172-73, 176; Andrew Ashworth & Elaine Player, Sentencing, Equal Treatment, and the Impact
of Sanctions, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON
HIRSCH 251, 259-60, 274-75 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998); Andrew Ashworth,
Sentencing Young Offenders, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 294, 300 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2009) (asserting that “we should recognise that punishments are generally more onerous for
the young because they impinge on important developmental interests, in terms of education and
socialisation, for which the teenage years are a crucial phase” and that “[p]roportionality theory
thus requires that sentence levels be significantly lower than those for adults . . . .”); Barry C. Feld,
A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV.
189, 247-48 (2007); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, Ch.
VI, para. 6 (1789) (delineating “circumstances influencing sensibility”).
134
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certain handicaps that would make his punishment significantly more onerous, the
sanction should be adjusted in order to avoid its having an undue differential
impact on him.” 138 The equal impact principle thus acknowledges the foreseeable,
typical, and serious side-effects that certain penalties hold for vulnerable
populations and seeks to adjust ordered sanctions so that members of vulnerable
classes receive penalties of roughly equivalent severity as non-vulnerable
individuals. 139 Understood properly, the equal impact principle does not call for a
reduction in punishment, but rather for equalizing the severity of penalties
imposed on equally blameworthy offenders. 140 In this way, recognition of the
equal impact principle may be necessary, at least in extreme cases, for the
effectuation of proportionality. 141

138

VON H IRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 135, at 172; see also
Ashworth & Player, supra note 137, at 253 (advocating “a general principle of equal treatment, by
which we mean that a sentencing system should strive to avoid its punishments having an unequal
impact on different offenders or groups of offenders”). The roots of the equal impact theory can be
traced to Jeremy Bentham. See BENTHAM, supra note 137, Ch. XIV, para. 14 (articulating a
principle of equal impact).
139
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 135, at 172; id.
at 176 (explaining that the aim of the equal impact principle, when applied in the case of an
offender with a physical handicap, is to make “adjustments in sentence to deal with certain
foreseeable differential impacts”); ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND PENAL POLICY 277
(1983) (“The argument, then, is that whilst it is just to impose the same sentence on two equally
culpable offenders for two equally grave offences, it is unjust to do so if the two offenders have
such differing ‘sensibilities’ that the sentence would have a significantly different effect on each of
them. The sentencer should take account of any relevant and significant differences, and should
strive to achieve equality of impact.”); see also Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of
Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 199-210 (2009) (arguing that various versions of
retributivism must factor subjective experience into sentencing in order to fulfill the
proportionality requirement); Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 194-95 nn.219-23, 221-29.
This stance may depend upon subscription to a definition of punishment that includes
foreseeable, substantial risks of serious harm, proximately caused by the state during confinement.
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 186-87. Traditionally, scholars have defined
punishment as including only hardships or deprivations intended and authorized by a legitimate
sentencing authority. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, Feinberg’s Liberal Theory of Punishment, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 111-12 (2001) (observing that the definitions of punishment offered by
Joel Feinberg, Stanley Benn, Antony Flew, H.L.A. Hart and John Rawls all specify that
deprivations or suffering imposed on a person for a legal wrong must be “intended” by a
recognized legal authority); see also Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 188 n.198
(collecting sources).
140
See VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 135, at 173
(“The equal-impact principle does not actually function as true equity mitigation, because it
actually does not call for qualifying defendants to suffer less punishment: it merely is a way of
avoiding that such defendant be made to suffer more.”).
141
See Ashworth & Player, supra note 137, at 255 (arguing that “those theories which have
some requirement of proportionality of sentence to the seriousness of the offence must surely
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Second, a retributive understanding of punishment suggests that a
sentencing system should consider an offender’s vulnerability in order to avoid
imposing inhumane punishments. Retributivism, premised upon respect for the
moral dignity and personhood of the offender, 142 cannot tolerate punishments that
violate human dignity, 143 fail to recognize the personality of offenders, 144 or
“approximate a system of sheer terror in which human beings are treated as
animals to be intimated and prodded.” 145 When, exactly, a mode of punishment or
conditions associated with a particular sanction cross the line from harsh to
inhumane is a difficult contextual question that ultimately reflects the sensitivities
and values of a particular society. 146 While corporal punishment was once

concern themselves with this problem [of equal impact]”); cf. VON HIRSCH & ASHWORTH,
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING, supra note 135, at 172 (asserting that, although the “‘equal impact’
principle is connected with the proportionalist sentencing model, [it] is not part of it in standard
cases” and that its use should be reserved for “unusual cases that diverge significantly from the
norm”).
142
See, e.g., BARBARA A. HUDSON, UNDERSTANDING JUSTICE 51 (2003) (discussing the moral
theory of Immanuel Kant and characterizing it as resting “on a model of the human as someone
whose actions are the result of moral choices”); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2
PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 217 (1973) (outlining Immanuel Kant’s theory of punishment with an
emphasis on its manifestation of respect for dignity, autonomy, rationality, and rights).
143
See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 233 (1979) (“A
punishment will be unjust (and thus banned on principle) if it is of such a nature as to be degrading
or dehumanizing (inconsistent with human dignity). The values of justice, rights and desert make
sense, after all, only on the assumption that we are dealing with creatures who are autonomous,
responsible, and deserving of the special kind of treatment due that status.”).
144
See id. at 233 (decrying “a punishment which is in itself degrading, which treats the
prisoner as an animal instead of a human being, which perhaps even is an attempt to reduce him to
an animal or a mere thing” as inconsistent with human dignity).
145
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 488 (1968).
146
See, e.g., JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 123 (1973) (“[T]here is a limit to the
severity of the punishment which can be humanely inflicted upon a wrongdoer. What these limits
are is of course a matter for debate, to be decided partly by recourse to normative
considerations.”); David Garland, Perspectives on Punishment, 14 CRIME & JUST. 115, 143 (1991)
(“[P]unishments are, in part, determined by the specific structure of our sensibilities, and . . . these
sensibilities are themselves subject to change and development.”).
This moral question parallels the legal inquiry of when punishment is deemed cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment. In Farmer v. Brennan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that,
for an inmate’s confinement to violate the Eighth Amendment, conditions must pose “a substantial
risk of serious harm.” 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In addition to proving that conditions pose a
substantial risk of harm, the inmate must demonstrate that the responsible prison official acted
with “deliberate indifference” towards his health or safety in allowing these conditions to exist.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference requires that prison officials have actual
knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fail to take reasonable
measures to abate the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838-42. Arguably, retributive theory, with its
focus on justice, morality, the dignity of the offender, and proportionate punishment, can and
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commonplace, much of the civilized world now rejects corporal sanctions, such as
whipping and lashing, as inhumane. 147 The same would hold true for sanctions
intended to disrupt profoundly one’s personality or senses or to precipitate mental
breakdown. 148 Philosophers, legal scholars, and courts have distinguished
incarceration from corporal sanctions, however, by emphasizing its primary
function as a deprivation of rights. 149 When incarceration carries a high likelihood
of victimization and psychological harm for individuals with certain
vulnerabilities, however, incarceration may more closely resemble an inhumane
corporal penalty than an unobjectionable deprivation of rights. 150 If this is true,

should be more sensitive to risk of physical and psychological harm than current Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 213 n.314.
147
See, e.g., Garland, supra note 146, at 143 (identifying “a whole range of possible
punishments (tortures, maimings, stonings, public whippings, etc.) that are simply ruled out as
‘unthinkable’ because they strike us as impossibly cruel and ‘barbaric’—as wholly out of keeping
with the sensibilities of modern, civilized human beings”); Ruplekha Khullar, Punishment and
Human Rights, in APPLIED ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND
CONTEXTUAL APPLICATIONS 183, 187 (Shaski Motilal ed., 2010) (“The horror of retributive
measures has, however, propelled humanity to move away from corporal punishment towards
more subtle methods.”); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 111 n.* (1976) (rejecting corporal
punishment as a permissible form of punishment because it “evokes in its victim intense feelings
of humiliation and terror” and asking: “Might there not exist a right to the integrity of one’s own
body, that not even the state’s interests in punishing may override?”).
148
See, e.g., Hernan Reyes, The Worst Scars Are In the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 591, 594-616 (2007), http://www.961.ch/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-867reyes.pdf (defining psychological torture and detailing various methods of psychological torture,
along with their effects); Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental
Illness in U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOL. 104, 104
(2010) (“Solitary confinement is recognized as difficult to withstand; indeed, psychological
stressors such as isolation can be as clinically distressing as physical torture.”).
149
See, e.g., J. D. Mabbott, Professor Flew on Punishment, 30 PHILOSOPHY 256, 257
(1955) (“Most punishments nowadays are not afflictions of suffering, either physical or mental.
They are the deprivation of a good.”); Geoffrey Scarre, Corporal Punishment, 6 Ethical Theory
&Moral Prac. 295, 297 (2003) (“Some punishments (e.g. imprisonment with hard labour) involve
both a corporal and a non-corporal element (the hard labour and the incarceration respectively).”);
see also Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WILLIAM &
MARY L. REV. 1575, 1589-90 (forthcoming, 2012), available at http:ssrn.com/abstract-2021398
(observing that terms of incarceration will almost always survive scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment).
150
See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U
L. Rev. 881, 915-16 (2009) (“To force prisoners to live in constant fear of violent assault, under
conditions in which many of the most vulnerable among them can expect that fear to be realized,
is to inflict a form of physical and psychological suffering akin to torture. It is plainly cruel to
punish criminal offenders with the strap, with rape, or with any other form of brutal corporal
treatment. And for the same reason, the state may not place incarcerated offenders in a position of
ongoing vulnerability to assault by predatory prisoners, thus creating conditions that would
amount to the same thing.”); David Garland, supra note 146, at 149 (“The crucial difference
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then, when the foreseeable risk of experiencing serious physical or psychological
harm in prison surpasses some threshold, 151 incarceration under a certain set of
conditions should no longer be a permissible punishment option. Thus, when a
judge believes that incarceration under standard conditions would pose an
unacceptable risk of serious harm to a particular offender, the judge should be
authorized to select an alternative sanction of roughly equivalent punitive bite or
to modify the offender’s conditions of confinement so that incarceration is a
morally tolerable option. 152
B.
Rehabilitative Rationales
In addition, two strains of rehabilitative thought could inspire the
consideration of mental disorder and vulnerability. The first view echoes the
understanding of punishment dominant in the United States from the World Wars
through the 1970s: the state, through criminal punishment, should seek to identify
and treat the underlying causes of an individual’s criminality. 153 Professor Francis
Allen has described the “rehabilitative ideal” in this way:
It is assumed, first, that human behavior is the product of
antecedent causes. These causes can be identified as part of the
physical universe[,] and it is the obligation of the scientist to

between corporal punishments that are banned, and other punishments—such as long-term
imprisonment that are routinely used, is not a matter of the intrinsic levels of pain and brutality
involved. It is a matter of the form which that violence takes, and the extent to which it impinges
on public sensibilities.”).
151
When that threshold exists will depend on the particularized risk of serious harm that
prison poses to an individual offender. See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 180
(“Statistical risk alone, however, may not merit a change in sentencing.”); cf. Kenneth W. Simons,
Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012) (distinguishing between
statistical and individualized knowledge for purposes of culpability determinations). Individuals
with serious mental illnesses often will be able to prove that they face a particularized risk of
serious harm from incarceration, beyond background statistical rates. In many instances an
individualized showing will be possible given prior patterns of behavior, personal history of abuse,
and the constellation of other risk factors that an individual may have that can be brought to a
judge’s attention at a sentencing hearing.
152
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 216-221 (describing how just deserts theory
can offer guidance for discerning alternative punishments of roughly equivalent punitive
onerousness).
153
See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1205, 1219-20 (1998); Francis A. Allen, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 2 (1981) (1979 Storrs Lectures on
Jurisprudence) (“[T]he rehabilitative ideal is the notion that a primary purpose of penal treatment
is to effect changes in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted offenders, so as to
strengthen the social defense against unwanted behavior, but also to contribute to the welfare and
satisfaction of offenders.”).
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discover and to describe them with all possible exactitude.
Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior makes possible
an approach to the scientific control of human behavior. Finally, . .
. it is assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted
offender should serve a therapeutic function, that such measures
should be designed to effect changes in the behavior of the
convicted person in the interest of his own happiness, health, and
satisfaction and in the interest of social defense. 154
While the rehabilitative ideal did not specify a single theory of crime causation,155
psychiatrist Karl Menninger, 156 Benjamin Karpman, 157 and others, 158 embraced a
medical model of crime. 159 According to this theory, criminal behavior is
symptomatic of mental illness or personality disorder. 160 In essence, offenders are
considered “sick” and in need of a state-coerced “cure” to address their
underlying sources of criminality. 161 Identification and treatment of an inmate’s
mental disorder, under this perspective, may be essential to restoring the offender
to a law-abiding citizen. 162 Evidence suggests, however, that offenders with major

154

Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in
PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 172-85, 173 (Jeffrie G. Murphy ed. 1973).
155
ALLEN, DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL, supra note 153, at 3.
156
See, e.g., Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION, supra note 154, at 132; KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968);
Karl Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 367 (1928).
157
See, e.g., Benjamin Karpman, Criminal Psychodyamics: A Platform, in PUNISHMENT AND
REHABILITATION, supra note 154, at 118; BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS
OFFENSES (1954); BENJAMIN KARPMAN, CASE STUDIES IN THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME
(1947).
158
See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1963) (arguing that the
criminal justice system should serve preventative, not punitive, ends and treat the origins of
criminality).
159
For a description of the tenets and evolution of therapeutic rehabilitation, see E. ROTMAN,
BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW ON THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 60-63
(1990). Most of the criticism of rehabilitation in the 1970s was aimed at the therapeutic model of
rehabilitation. Id. at 5.
160
See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Introduction, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION, supra note
154, at 1, 5; Karpman, supra note 157, at 119 (arguing that “criminality is but a symptom of
insanity”).
161
See ROTMAN, supra note 159, at 5.
162
As I have argued elsewhere, these views, or similar ones, inspire therapeutic jurisprudence
and modern problem-solving courts, including mental health courts. See Johnston, Theorizing
Mental Health Courts, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 519, 547-51 (2012); see also Boldt, supra note 153, at
1212-18, 1226-34, 1237, 1243-45 (arguing that, while drug treatment courts do not occasion a full
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mental disorder often retain the ability to make rational choices and that their
criminal behavior may reflect varying motivations. 163 A less radical and perhaps
more supportable view is that the treatment and control of symptoms associated
with mental illness is necessary to allow an individual with a serious mental
illness to benefit from programming, which has been shown by some studies to
hold rehabilitative potential. 164
C.
Collateral Benefits
Finally, collateral benefits would attend a judge’s consideration and
accommodation of offender vulnerability at sentencing. Expressing concern for
individuals’ actual prison experience would serve as a means to honor offenders’
personhood and inherent worth. 165 Authorizing judges to consider, acknowledge,
and respond to foreseeable, substantial risks of harm would expose prison
conditions and correctional mental health services to the light of day and should
prompt the reform of both. 166 Sustained attention to the plight of vulnerable
populations should also increase consideration of and demand for alternative
sentencing options, such as home detention with electronic monitoring, halfway
houses, inpatient and outpatient mental health treatment, and mandatory
community service. Many of these noncarceral penalties are much less expensive
than prison, which could offer welcome cost savings. 167 Finally, by factoring
vulnerability into sentencing, judges would be active participants in the most
important exercise of all: making our criminal justice system more just and less
cruel.

return to the rehabilitative ideal, the courts possess multiple rehabilitative elements and should
thus be subjected to the critiques levied against rehabilitation in the late 1960s and 1970s); JAMES
L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 185-208 (2001);
James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1554-63 (2003) (arguing that drug treatment courts represent in many
ways a return to a rehabilitative theory of punishment).
163
See Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, supra note 162, at 558-61 (discussing
social scientists’ views of the varying motivations for crimes committed by individuals with
serious mental illnesses).
164
See THIGPEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.
165
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 195-97.
166
See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 141 (2006)
(“[T]o the extent that sexual coercion in prison cannot be eliminated, we should make that fact
part of debates about the appropriate use of imprisonment as a penalty.”).
167
See LINH VUONG, ET AL., NATIONAL COUNSEL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, THE
EXTRAVAGANCE
OF
IMPRISONMENT
REVISITED
(2010),
http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/specialreport-extravagance.pdf
(analyzing incarcerated populations in the U.S, and four states to determine the percentage of
nonserious offenders and concluding that a significant cost savings could be realized if these
offenders were sentenced to noncarceral alternatives).
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IV.
Jurisdictions’ Current Treatment of Vulnerability as a Mitigating
Factor
Recognizing that incarceration entails excessive suffering for certain
offenders and thus may impede the desired ends of punishment, many
jurisdictions allow a judge to consider an offender’s likely hardship when
deciding whether to order a sentence of incarceration or determining its
duration. 168 While these efforts are salutary, they do not go far enough to ensure
that vulnerable offenders receive humane or proportionate sentences.
A number of states and the federal government recognize vulnerability or
excessive offender hardship as a mitigating factor for purposes of sentencing. 169
Many state statutes frame the mitigating factor in general, source-neutral terms.
Arkansas, Hawaii, Indiana, Montana, Louisiana, North Dakota, New Jersey, and
Utah, for instance, authorize judges to consider when imprisonment would result
in “undue” or “excessive” hardship to the offender. 170 Other states specify that

168

See supra note 9 (stressing that explicit authorization is most critical in jurisdictions with
determinate sentencing regimes).
169
In addition, states may have a “catch-all” provision, which allows courts to mitigate an
individual’s sentence when it feels that doing so is necessary for the ends of justice. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-701(E)(6) (West 2012) (providing that the court shall consider “[a]ny
other factor that is relevant to the defendant’s character or background or to the nature or
circumstances of the crime and that the court finds to be mitigating”).
170
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-301(c)(11) (West 2012) (authorizing the trial court to
consider, in favor of suspension or probation for most criminal offenses, whether “[t]he
imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or to a dependent
of the defendant”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-621(2)(i) (West 2012) (“The court, in determining
whether to impose a term of probation, shall consider [whether] . . . [t]he imprisonment of the
defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant's dependents[.]”);
IND. CODE ANN. 35-38-1-7.1(b)(10) (West 2012) (“The court may consider the following factors
as mitigating circumstances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing probation: . . .
Imprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship to the person or the dependents of the
person.”); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 894.1.B(31) (West 2012) (providing that courts,
when deciding whether to suspend a sentence and impose probation, should consider whether
“[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his
dependents”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-225(j) (West 2012) (“Prior to sentencing a nonviolent
felony offender to whom 46-18-219 does not apply to a term of imprisonment in a state prison, the
sentencing judge shall take into account whether: . . . imprisonment of the offender would create
an excessive hardship on the offender or the offender’s family.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:441(b)(11) (West 2012) (listing, as a criterion for the appropriateness of imprisonment as a sanction,
whether “imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his
dependents”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-32-04(11) (West 2011) ) (suggesting that the trial
court should consider, in deciding whether to order imprisonment, whether “[t]he imprisonment of
the defendant would entail undue hardship to himself or his dependents”); Utah Sentencing
Commission, 2012 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines (Form 2, page 12),
http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/2011%20Adult%20Sentencing%20and%20Rele
ase%20Guidelines.pdf (specifying as a mitigating factor that may “compel deviation from the
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mitigation may be appropriate when the likely hardship stems from a specific
source. One example is Illinois, which provides that a sentencing judge should
consider, as a factor in favor of withholding or minimizing a sentence of
imprisonment, whether “the imprisonment of the defendant would endanger his or
her medical condition.” 171 The District of Columbia, on the other hand, allows a
judge to sentence outside the voluntary sentencing guidelines when “the court
determines that the defendant, by reason of obvious and substantial mental or
physical impairment or infirmity, cannot be adequately protected or treated in any
available prison facility.” 172
Currently, a judge’s consideration of an offender’s likely hardship in
prison may affect an offender’s sentence in one of two ways. First, offender
hardship may militate towards a suspended sentence of incarceration with
probation. 173 For example, New Jersey and Louisiana authorize judges to
consider, when determining the appropriateness of imprisonment as a sanction,
whether “imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to

guidelines” when “[i]mprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or dependents”);
see also 9 MINN. PRAC., CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE §36.30(j) (3d ed.) (authorizing, though
case law, a dispositional departure where defendant’s youth, immaturity, or old age make her
vulnerable to victimization in a prison setting); see generally Carissa Byre Hessick, Ineffective
Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1120 & n.284 (2009) (characterizing whether
imprisonment would constitute a hardship for the offender as a mitigating factor that has been
considered “particularly powerful in various jurisdictions” and listing some jurisdictions).
171
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5 / 5-5-3.1(a)(12) (West 2012). Other states classify an
offender’s need for treatment as a mitigating factor. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026(2)
(West 2012) (treating, as a mitigating circumstance, when “[t]he defendant requires specialized
treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical
disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment”), HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606(2)(d) (West
2012) (charging the court to consider, when imposing a sentence, the need “[t]o provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner”); OR. ADMIN. R. 213-008-0002(1)(a)(I) (2012) (listing, as
a mitigating factor that may be considered in determining whether substantial and compelling
reasons for a departure exist, when “[t]he offender is amenable to treatment and an appropriate
treatment program is available to which the offender can be admitted within a reasonable period of
time; the treatment program is likely to be more effective than the presumptive prison term in
reducing the risk of offender recidivism; and the probation sentence will serve community safety
interests by promoting offender reformation.”).
172
DIST. OF COLUMBIA SENTENCING & CRIMINAL CODE REVISION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5.2.3(8) (2012).
173
See supra note 170. Professor Richard Frase has argued that mitigated departures for
unamenability to prison and amenability to probation, in the context of the Minnesota sentencing
scheme, may be consistent with limiting retributivism. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in
Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections on Dale G. Parent's Structuring Criminal Sentences: The
Evolution of Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines, 75 MINN. L. REV. 727, 742-46 (1991).
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himself . . . .” 174 In these states, offender hardship is one factor, among many, to
weigh when deciding whether an executed sentence of imprisonment or a
suspended sentence with probation is the more appropriate punishment for a given
offender. Perhaps not surprisingly, a review of case law suggests that the
mitigating factor typically only leads to an order of probation for those offenders
who have limited aggravating factors, no prior criminal history, or who would
otherwise be amenable to probation. 175 In states that limit the mitigating factor to
the probation/incarceration calculus, 176 courts lack the means to recognize, or
mitigate, the vulnerability of offenders who fall outside this narrow band and
receive sentences of incarceration.
Other jurisdictions, including the federal government, 177 allow courts to
shorten the prison terms of offenders likely to suffer extreme hardship when

174

LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 894.1.B(31) (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:441(b)(11) (West 2012).
175
See, e.g., State v. Evers, 815 A.2d 432, 451-55 (N.J. 2003); State v. Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559,
561, 564, 559 (N.J. 1989) (finding that the extreme hardship of the mentally retarded offender,
who had suffered almost daily severe abuse in prison and had attempted suicide, outweighed the
deterrent value of her carceral sentence, where no aggravating factors applied and the defendant
was unlikely to commit future violent acts); State v. E.R., 641 A.2d 1072, 1073, 1077 (N.J. Super.
App. Div.1994) (approving a probationary sentence upon resentencing where the offender was
amenable to probation, would suffer extreme hardship in prison, and was not at risk of committing
another offense, as he was likely to die within a few months from AIDS); see also State v. Wright,
310 N.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Minn. 1981) (upholding the dispositional departure where the defendant
was “more child than man” and would be victimized easily in prison, no appropriate psychiatric
institution was available, the defendant was amenable to individualized treatment in a
probationary setting, and the defendant would pose little threat to society if supervised through
out-patient treatment); State v. Hitz, 1990 WL 115108, *2 (Minn. App.) (affirming dispositional
departure based on reports that the defendant would be suicidal if the sentence were executed and
that his mental disorder rendered him more amenable to probation and treatment than prison);
Rachel Konforty, Efforts to Control Judicial Discretion: The Problem of AIDS and Sentencing,
1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 49, 64-65, 92-94 (1998) (describing New Jersey’s statutory framework
and its application within the context of AIDS and HIV).
176
Minnesota allows vulnerability to abuse—an offender-related trait, as opposed to an
offense-related characteristic—to support a dispositional departure in the form of a stayed
sentence, but not a durational departure in the form of a reduced term of years in prison. See State
v. Behl, 573 N.W.2d 711, 713-14 (Minn. App. 1998) (holding that trial court properly refused to
consider offender-related mitigation evidence of amenability to probation because, while such
evidence may be used to justify a dispositional departure, it cannot serve as the basis for durational
departure).
177
See Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of Guideline
Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 571-74 (2006) (describing the operation of downward
departures on the basis of vulnerability under the federal sentencing guidelines). Under the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, mental and emotional conditions are ordinarily irrelevant in determining
whether a sentence should fall outside the sentencing range established by the Guidelines for a
criminal offense. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 5H1.3 (2010).
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incarcerated. 178 These jurisdictions, in effect, allow a sentencing “discount” for
the increased severity of an offender’s carceral sentence, as compared to the
anticipated prison experience of a standard offender. 179 Judges in these
jurisdictions cannot tailor the conditions of confinement in order to reduce the
vulnerable offender’s risk of harm. This has led to charges, such as those raised
by Professor Mary Sigler, that federal courts which grant downward departures
for extreme vulnerability to victimization are, in practice, sentencing vulnerable
defendants to prison terms “at rape” or to terms involving other forms of
inhumanity or cruelty. 180
Thus, jurisdictions’ current approaches, while a definite improvement over
sentencing systems that discourage judges from modifying presumptive sentences
on the basis of their likely injurious effect, do not go far enough. Although
intermediate sanctions such as weekends in jail and laborious community service
may provide appropriate (and cost-effective) 181 penalties for many offenders,182
imprisonment will likely remain a necessary sanction for the most serious

However, under Guidelines Section 5H1.3, an offender’s vulnerability due to mental or emotional
conditions may justify a downward departure so long as such conditions “are present to an unusual
degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” U.S.S.G. §
5H1.3 (2010). Some courts have also relied on Guidelines Sections 5K2.0, 5H1.4, and 5K2.13 to
grant downward departures on the basis of suspected or demonstrated hardship in prison. See
Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 181-82 & nn.172-75.
178
See, e.g., Kern v. State, 884 N.E.2d 440, *2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the trial
court afforded sufficient weight to defendant’s back pain and pleurisy as a mitigating factor when
it sentenced her to less than the maximum sentence of incarceration); Moyer v. State, 796 N.E.2d
309, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
consider the defendant’s history of lymphoma, malignancy of the larynx, recurring tumors,
pulmonary disease, reliance on a breathing apparatus, and need for frequent tracheal cleanings and
sterile catheters in sentencing and electing to reduce the defendant’s sentence from 40 to 24 years
in prison).
179
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 201-03.
180
Sigler, supra note 177, at 573.
181
See Robert E. Harlow, et al., The Severity of Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A
Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 71, 72 (1995) (“Intermediate sanctions offer the promise of reducing overcrowding,
thereby enabling the prison system to retain violent criminals for nearer the full term of their
sentences and, also, to reduce costs, given the high expense of imprisonment.”); supra note 167.
182
See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 127 (1996) (“There is a need for credible,
enforceable sanctions between prison and probation that can provide appropriate deserved
penalties for offenders convicted of mid-level crimes.”); Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best,
91 GEO L.J. 949, 996 (2003) (“For less serious crimes there are a number of alternatives to prison
sentences that people would perceive as having a punitive ‘bite’ comparable to that of a short
prison term … such as home confinement, labor-intensive community service, weekends in jail,
and fines.”).

36

HUMANE PUNISHMENT
*DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
MAY 3, 2013

offenses. 183 Assuming that incarceration is the only appropriate sanction for some
offenses, offenders with serious mental illnesses who commit these offenses with
the requisite mental state should endure incarceration, but only under conditions
that are humane and that approximate, as closely as possible, the conditions that a
non-vulnerable person would experience if confined. 184 The next two Parts
explore how legislatures could expand judges’ control over the terms and
conditions of carceral sentences in response to the foreseeable hardship of
seriously disordered offenders to better ensure that their sentences serve the
legitimate aims of punishment.
V.
Sentencing as a Means to Flag Offenders with Serious Mental
Disorder
One source of concern regarding an offender with a serious mental
disorder is that correctional authorities will fail to detect his disorder, resulting in
a withholding of treatment and perhaps his placement in an inappropriate
environment. As previously discussed, correctional officials conduct mental
health screens at intake as a form of triage, based largely on information revealed
through a short interview. 185 Often only a subset of individuals receives
comprehensive assessments by a psychologist or psychiatrist. 186 One contribution
that judges could make to improve the prison experience of seriously disordered
defendants would be to ensure that these individuals receive comprehensive
mental health evaluations by qualified mental health professionals at intake, thus
improving their likelihood of receiving treatment and appropriate housing.

183

Some commentators have opined that incarceration is the only sanction severe enough to
communicate the degree of censure warranted for commission of serious offenses. See, e.g., VON
HIRSCH, supra note 147, at 111 (“One reason for preferring incarceration is that we have not found
another satisfactory severe punishment.”); Harlow, et al., supra note 181, at 86 (noting that survey
respondents viewed 18 months of intermediate sanctions as equivalent to 6 months imprisonment,
but that “[n]o intermediate sanctions were seen as equivalent to prison terms of 2 years or more”).
In addition, incarceration may be the only sanction likely to serve as an effective general or
specific deterrent. See DAVID C. ANDERSON, SENSIBLE JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON 19
(1998) (noting that a central principal of sentencing should be to “reserve the most serious
confinement and punishment for the most serious criminals”); id. at 144 (stating that alternative
sanctions are preferable but that the following three reasons justify incarceration: “to affirm the
gravity of the crime, to deter the criminal and others who are like-minded, or because other
sanctions have proved insufficient”).
184
See Bonnie P. Tucker, Deaf Prison Inmates: Time to Be Heard, 22 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 1,
14 (1988-89) (arguing that the solution to the problem of the harsher prison experience of deaf
prisoners “lies in equalizing—to the extent practicable—the conditions of confinement for deaf
and hearing prisoners”).
185
See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.
186
See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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This reform could take at least two forms. One option would be for a
legislature to provide that, when a sentencing judge includes a finding in his
sentencing order that an individual has a serious mental disorder, the correctional
agency must ensure that the prisoner receives a comprehensive mental health
evaluation, by a qualified and licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, within a
certain number of hours of admission to an intake facility. Alternatively, a
legislature could permit the judge to include such an evaluation as a condition of
his sentence. In this way, a judge’s sentencing order could eliminate the
uncertainty of the screening process for a given offender, supplying the “urgency”
necessary to trigger a comprehensive assessment and accelerating the timing of
the assessment. 187
As described below, a sentencing judge’s assessment of a defendant’s
mental health may be more likely to be accurate than that of an intake
evaluator, 188 given the judge’s familiarity with the defendant and the information
that the defendant may bring to the judge’s attention during the sentencing
hearing. Therefore, factoring a judge’s assessment of a defendant’s mental health
into the correctional evaluation process should result in the latter’s being more
informed, more efficient, and more accurate. It also should result in fewer
disordered individuals slipping through the cracks. In this way, a judge’s finding
of mental disorder could serve as a more appropriate mechanism to secure the
primary benefit currently obtained through a guilty but mentally ill verdict.
A.
Relative Accuracy of Judicial Findings of Mental Disorder
A judge at sentencing is likely to have a much more nuanced
understanding of the offender—including his mental health history and current
mental health status—than officials at intake. 189 Because an individual’s capacity
to understand reality and conform his conduct to the dictates of the law may
implicate his culpability for past acts and his ability to participate in the
adversarial process, multiple steps are built into the criminal justice process to
allow for consideration of a defendant’s mental illness. A judicial official will
consider an offender’s mental health when determining bail and pretrial release

187

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Since a judge is not a mental health professional, his assessment (though likely based on
psychiatric opinions) may be less likely to be accurate than that of a clinical or forensic
psychologist or psychiatrist. Therefore, this Article merely proposes that a judicial finding of
serious mental disorder trigger a comprehensive assessment by a qualified mental health
professional; it does not recommend that the judicial finding substitute for, or obviate the need for,
a later assessment by a mental health professional.
189
But see supra note 188 (noting that a judge’s finding of mental disorder may be less
accurate than that of a psychologist or psychiatrist).
188
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conditions. 190 Mental disorder will be a key focal point of any challenge to the
accused’s competence to stand trial 191 or his decisional competence to make the
few choices allocated to him, such as whether to waive his right to counsel and
plead guilty. 192 If the accused pleads not guilty, he may use evidence of mental
disorder to advance an insanity defense, demonstrate a lack of intent, or perhaps
further other defenses such as provocation or self-defense. 193 In addition, many
state statutes require probation officers to include an offender’s mental health
history in the presentencing report created for the court, 194 and others permit
officers to include this information if relevant to the appropriateness of sentencing
options. 195 Thus, in the case of an offender with a serious mental illness, at the

190

See JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL
SERVICES PROGRAMS 13 (2003), available at http://www.napsa.org/publications/prog21stcent.pdf
(noting that pretrial services officers typically provide judges with information about defendants’
mental health statuses for consideration in bail determinations).
191
See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (establishing that, to stand trial, a
defendant must possess “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him”); see also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). Courts have
interpreted this competency standard to require that a defendant be able to appreciate his status as
a defendant in a criminal prosecution and understand the charges, the purpose of the criminal
process, and the purpose of the adversary system, including the role played by defense counsel.
See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 539, 554 & n.62, 63 (1993).
192
See Bonnie, supra note 191, at 553-60 (exploring the concept of decisional competence).
193
Prior to consideration of vulnerability at the sentencing phase, a defendant’s mental illness
may reduce his culpability at the guilt phase of his proceeding. Others have argued for the
expansion or reduction of these defensive strategies. Compare Christopher Slobogin, An End to
Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1246
(2000), with Laura Reider, Toward a New Test For Insanity Defense: Incorporating The
Discoveries of Neuroscience Into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289, (1998). This
Article takes no position on these issues.
194
See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 5-3-2(a)(1) (West 2012) (“In felony cases, the
presentence report shall set forth the defendant’s history of delinquency or criminality, physical
and mental history and condition, family situation and background, economic status, education,
occupation and personal habits. . . .”); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 901.3(8) (West 2012) (“If a presentence
investigation is ordered by the court, the investigator shall promptly inquire into . . .[w]hether the
defendant has a history of mental health or substance abuse problems.”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 390.20 (McKinney 2010) (requiring pre-sentence investigation and report for all offenders
convicted of felonies and certain offenders convicted of misdemeanors); id. at §390.30 (requiring
that pre-sentence report include information regarding defendant’s mental health).
195
See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-18-112(3) (2011) (“The court may, in its discretion,
require that the presentence investigation report include a physical and mental examination of the
defendant.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A) (“The probation officer must conduct a presentence
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moment of sentencing a judge likely will be familiar with the defendant’s mental
health history and current mental health status. A judge should be adept at
considering both evidence of mental disorder and its likely effect on an
individual’s future prison experience, as individualized risk assessment is a
routine aspect of judging. 196
In addition, unlike in the intake setting, a defendant has a number of rights
that bear on his ability to bring relevant evidence of mental disorder and
vulnerability to the attention of the sentencing judge. An indigent defendant has a
Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel at a sentencing hearing, 197 when his
sentence may include suspended or actual incarceration. 198 In addition, defendants

investigation and submit a report to the court before it imposes sentence”); id. at 32(d)(1)(D)(i)
(“The presentence report must identify any factor relevant to the appropriate kind of sentence”).
196
Judges make individualized risk assessments in a number of contexts, including bail
determinations, capital sentencing, and sex offender sentencing. See, e.g., Carol
Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 774
(1998) (observing that the use of actuarial instruments is most prevalent in furthering our nascent
mission as a “preventive state”); Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of
Individual Risk Assessment in Criminal Justice, 1 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 397, 398 (2005)
(finding that “risk assessment has become a largely uncontested aspect of a much expanded
criminal process, and it has been entrusted to a range of criminal justice actors,” including judges);
CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INS., STATE OF THE SCIENCE
OF
PRETRIAL
RISK
ASSESSMENT
6
(2011),
available
at
http://www.pretrial.org/Setting%20Bail%20Documents/PJI%20State%20of%20the%20Science%
20Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20(2011).pdf (noting that the availability of “objective
research-based” risk assessment tools has better equipped judges “to assign more rational
conditions of release or detention”).
197
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967) (stating that “appointment of counsel for an
indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal
accused may be affected … [and that due to] the critical nature of sentencing … the right to
counsel applies at sentencing”).
198
See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 654–55
(2002). In dicta, the U.S. Supreme Court has also suggested that indigent defendants have a right
to appointed counsel in all felony cases. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 746 (1994).
Though the Supreme Court has never addressed the precise scope of the right, defendants appear
to have a right to effective assistance of counsel at noncapital sentencing proceedings, as defined
by the two-part test delineated in Strickland v. Washington. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (stating that the defendant must show first “that counsel’s performance was
deficient” and second “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense”); Glover v. United
States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001) (noting that even a minimal amount of additional jail time
resulting from counsel’s deficient performance constitutes prejudice to the defendant); see also
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (holding that, even though the defendant would not
have received the death penalty had his lawyer objected, the defendant was not unconstitutionally
prejudiced where the sentence was not “fundamentally unfair or unreliable” in light of a
subsequent change in the relevant case law). Commentators have worked to delineate standards for
evaluating ineffectiveness claims in the context of non-capital sentencing. See Hessick, supra note
170, at 1080, 1086 (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet decided what standard applies to
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may have a right to review and respond to assertions included in a presentence
report. 199 In non-capital cases, states typically allow defense counsel the
opportunity to challenge or supplement information in a presentence report or, if
no such report is compiled or it is not disclosed, gather and submit to the court
any evidence concerning a defendant’s mental health history, status, or prognosis
that counsel believes should result in mitigation or the adoption of an alternative
sentence. 200 Some courts have held that a defendant has a constitutional right to
allocution at sentencing, 201 and defendants may have a due process right to call
critical witnesses to testify on their behalf. 202 Also, while federal courts take the
position that defendants have no constitutional right to confront and cross-

ineffective assistance at sentencing claims in discretionary non-capital sentencing systems” and
suggesting that a heightened standard is inappropriate and, instead, “any defendant who can
demonstrate a reasonable probability that her sentence was increased by any amount of actual jail
time should be deemed to have satisfied the prejudice prong of her ineffective assistance claim”);
Note, Prejudice and Remedies: Establishing a Comprehensive Framework for Ineffective
Assistance Length-of-Sentence Claims, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2143, 2152 (2006) (suggesting that
“Strickland should be understood to require only a reasonable probability of a shorter sentence for
length-of-sentence claims based on errors made at sentencing in a discretionary regime”).
199
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977). The U.S. Supreme Court has not determined
whether this right extends to presentence reports in non-capital cases.
200
See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_df
unc_blkold.html (standard 4-8.1 for sentencing); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.713 (requiring the
sentencing court, upon motion of the defendant, to include in the presentence report a mental
examination of the defendant that may be relevant to the sentencing decision); N.Y. CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW §§ 390.30–.40 (McKinney 2011) (stating that the defendant may, at any time
prior to the pronouncement of sentence, file with the court a written memorandum setting forth
any information he may deem pertinent to the question of his sentence, including information
related to the defendant’s mental health).
201
See United States v. Biagon, 510 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, while a
defendant does not have “a right to unlimited allocution,” “[t]he right to allocution may be
satisfied by allowing a defendant an opportunity to make a statement before the end of sentencing
but after the court has indicated its tentative conclusions on sentencing”); United States v. Reyna,
358 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under the law of this Circuit, the right to allocution applies at
sentencing following revocation of supervised release.”).
202
See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (finding, where a capital defendant was
prevented from proffering testimony during the sentencing stage of his trial that “this exclusion
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). But see Oregon v. Guzek, 546
U.S. 517 (2006) (holding that the defendant had no right to present evidence of innocence at his
sentencing hearing, where a state statute allowed the defendant to introduce any evidence of his
innocence that had been admitted at trial); McGinnis v. Johnson, 181 F.3d 686,693 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a defendant’s Due Process rights were not violated when hearsay evidence from a
psychiatric expert’s interview with defendant was excluded during the sentencing phase of a
capital case).
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examine hostile witnesses at non-capital 203 sentencing hearings, 204 some state
courts have held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies to
non-capital sentencing proceedings. 205 Jurisdictions may convey additional rights
through rule or common law. 206 Therefore, in contrast to his situation during
intake, a criminal defendant at sentencing would at the very least have an
attorney’s assistance in gathering evidence of mental disorder and vulnerability,
bringing this information to the judge’s attention, and arguing that it warrants
mitigation (if supported by law). 207 Moreover, a criminal defendant would have
the benefit of a neutral decision-maker whose priority is to determine an
appropriate, proportionate, and humane penalty for the offender. 208

203

A minority of federal courts have held that defendants have a right to confront adverse
witnesses in capital sentencing proceedings. See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1253-54
(11th Cir. 1982) (noting that “[w]hether the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses extends to
capital sentencing proceedings has not been specifically addressed by the Supreme Court” and
holding that “the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings”);
United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the
Confrontation Clause applies during the selection phase and at least part of the eligibility phase of
capital sentencing).
204
See United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2009) (listing cases).
205
See, e.g., Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, *10 (2011) (“[W]e are convinced that the right
of confrontation, guaranteed by . . . the Sixth Amendment . . . extends to Appellant’s sentencing
proceeding before a jury.”); State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672, 680-81 (Minn. 2008) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation applies during jury sentencing trials); State v.
Hurt, 702 S.E.2d 82, 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the right to confrontation “applies to
all sentencing proceedings where a jury makes the determination of a fact or facts that, if found,
increase the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum”); Amanda Harris, Surpassing
Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1447 (2012) (distinguishing between trends in federal and state law and arguing that the right of
confrontation should apply during sentencing, or at least during capital sentencing).
206
See Hessick, supra note 170 , at 1101 n.178 (listing sources of authority).
207
See id. at 1102-05 (observing that mandatory and discretionary sentencing regimes that
explicitly identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors “provide an easy standard against
which to measure counsel’s performance at sentencing” and stressing that counsel has a duty to
investigate the existence of an available mitigating factor).
208
Jurisdictions vary in their articulated aims of sentencing, but retributive principles inspire
the sentencing codes of many jurisdictions. See Richard Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 76 & n.22 (2005) (claiming that nearly every jurisdiction in the United States has
promulgated sentencing codes consistent with Norval Morris’s limiting retributivism); Paul H.
Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=924917 (“In the US, a number
of sentencing guidelines have adopted desert as their distributive principle, and it is increasingly
given deference in the ‘purposes’ section of state criminal codes, where it can be the guiding
principle in the interpretation and application of the code’s provisions . . . .”). Contra Michael
Tonry, Looking Back to See the Future of Punishment in America, 74 SOC. RESEARCH 353, 363
(2007) (“In this first decade of the twenty-first century, there is neither a prevailing punishment
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Furthermore, the public nature of the proceeding would also impart
valuable transparency and accountability to the evaluation process. 209 Currently,
prisons conduct their mental health and vulnerability assessments behind closed
doors, so decisions regarding assessment, treatment, and discipline receive little
scrutiny. Allowing a judge to factor an individual’s mental disorder and
vulnerability to harm into sentencing would bring these assessments—and
underlying prison conditions—to light and subject them to review and public
debate.
B.
Comparison to Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict
If a judge were able to secure a post-conviction psychiatric evaluation for
a seriously disordered prisoner, the judge would be able to effect the primary
benefit that a guilty but mentally ill verdict provides for disordered offenders, but
in a more appropriate form. While statutes differ, one common formulation of the
guilty but mentally ill verdict allows a jury to find a defendant who has asserted
an insanity defense “guilty but mentally ill,” thus exposing him to any sentence
appropriate for the offense but specifying that the defendant is eligible for
treatment while incarcerated. 210 Numerous legal commentators have observed that
the guilty but mentally ill verdict has not resulted in better treatment for offenders
so designated than for other mentally ill prisoners. 211 In some states, however, the

paradigm in practice nor a prevailing normative framework for assessing or talking about
punishment in principle.”).
209
See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing
Structures, 64 U. COLO L. REV. 679, 689 (1993) (“[T]he judiciary is the discretionary point that is
most accountable. Compared to any other discretionary point—prosecutors, corrections
administrators, or parole boards—judicial decisions are public, as is the information on which they
base their decisions (open at least to those involved with the case, if not to the public at large).
Judges are expected to provide reasons for their decisions and there is a strong tradition of review
for most decisions—although not for sentencing decisions. With respect to sentencing under a
structured system, judges are experienced in applying general principles, concepts, and standards
to particular cases.”).
210
See Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time
Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 495 (1984-85).
211
See, e.g., John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity
Defense and Civil Commitment Reforms Made a Difference?, 39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 103 (1994)
(“Contrary to the expectation that accompanied GBMI legislation, GBMI offenders are no more
likely to receive treatment than mentally ill offenders in the general inmate population who have
not been found GBMI.”); Lisa A. Callahan, et al., Measuring the Effects of the Guilty but Mentally
Ill (GBMI) Verdict, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 460 (1992) (“[T]he treatment available to
GBMIs is no different from that available to other prisoners with mental health needs.”); Ingo
Keilitz, Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 289, 319 (1987);
Slobogin, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, supra note 210, at 513-14 (identifying legal and fiscal
constraints that minimize differences in the treatment afforded to guilty and guilty but mentally ill
prisoners).
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verdict has increased the likelihood that offenders will receive a psychiatric
evaluation, thus increasing the odds that their illnesses will be detected, and thus
that the inmates ultimately will receive mental health treatment in prison. 212 A
judge’s finding at sentencing could operate in the same fashion.
Moreover, a judge’s finding of mental disorder at sentencing would be
more probative, and more appropriate, than the finding of mental disorder
communicated through a guilty but mentally ill verdict. Commentators have
criticized guilty but mentally ill verdicts on the basis that assessments of mental
disorder at the time of the crime are largely irrelevant to a prisoner’s mental
health needs during confinement. 213 This objection holds less purchase in the
context of sentencing, however, since a sentencing judge’s concerns rightfully
extend to an inmate’s predicted mental health needs in prison, among other
issues, 214 and the judge’s assessment takes place shortly before admission to
prison.
VI.

Sentencing as a Means to Equalize Conditions of Confinement
Beyond raising an offender’s disorder to the attention of correctional
officials, legislatures should consider authorizing judges to tailor the carceral
sentences of vulnerable, seriously disordered offenders as a means to effectuate
proportionate and humane punishment and to equalize, at least in part, the carceral

212

Slobogin, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, supra note 210, at 514 n.95 (observing that, “[i]n
many states, guilty but mentally ill offenders receive post-conviction evaluation more often than
do other offenders; therefore, their treatment needs are more likely to be identified); Keilitz, supra
note 211, at 319 (concluding, from a review of records from Georgia, Illinois, and Michigan, that
at least 90% of GBMI inmates received a post-conviction mental health evaluation, and that
treatment was recommended in 64-72% of those cases); cf. Linda A. Teplin, Detecting Disorder:
The Treatment of Mental Illness Among Jail Detainees, 58 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
233, 234 (1990) (documenting that jail officials treated as “detected” the mental disorder of any
detainee evaluated for incompetency to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity, regardless of
outcome).
213
Slobogin, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, supra note 210, at 518; Mark A. Woodmansee,
The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: Political Expediency at the Expense of Moral Principle, 10
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 341, 385 (1996) (“Although the jury [in a guilty but not
mentally ill case] found evidence of mental illness, this indicates only that the defendant suffered
from mental illness at the time of the offense. Such a determination is not dispositive of whether
the defendant should receive mental health treatment at the time he is sentenced.”).
214
A defendant’s mental disorder may impact sentencing in several ways. His mental
impairment at the time of the crime may serve as a mitigating factor to the extent that it reduces
his culpability. In addition, mental illness may aggravate a defendant’s sentence, as sentencing
bodies appear to assume that mental disorder correlates with dangerousness. See, e.g., Ellen F.
Berkman, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 291, 299-300 (1989) (discussing the use of mental disorder, a mitigating factor, as an
aggravating circumstance in capital sentencing).
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experiences of disordered and standard offenders. 215 Legislatures possess the
inherent authority to designate where offenders will serve sentences of
incarceration 216 and to provide for the proper care and treatment of prisoners.217
While in modern history legislatures have tended to delegate the placement
authority to prison authorities in recognition of their expertise and need to control
housing decisions when managing large numbers of prisoners, 218 a legislature
could instead retain this power 219 or delegate it to the judiciary. 220 Furthermore,

215

See supra notes 184 & 208 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., State v. Bouck, 633 N.W.2d 163, 165 (N.D. 2001) (“When the law prescribes a
place of imprisonment the court cannot direct a different place and, if it does, the sentence is
void.”); see infra note 220 (tracing Congress’s delegation of the placement authority to the judicial
and then executive branches).
217
See Estabrook v. King, 119 F.2d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 1941) (“Congress undeniably has the
power to make provision for the proper care and treatment of federal prisoners during the period of
their incarceration, and to set up any form of administrative machinery that it deems necessary for
this purpose.”).
218
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (2006) (“The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of
the prisoner’s imprisonment.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.315(7) (2011) (“The department [of
corrections] shall place each offender in the program or facility most appropriate to the offender’s
needs, subject to budgetary limitations and the availability of space.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4256-10(13) (2012) (granting the director of the department of corrections the power to “assign or
transfer those persons [committed to the custody of the department] to appropriate facilities and
programs”); see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“It is well settled that the decision
where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators’ expertise.”).
219
See Bouck, 633 N.W.2d at 165. A recent manifestation of this power is California’s
“realignment” initiative, under which all felonies that are non-serious and non-violent, including
non-registerable sex offenses, are now punishable by incarceration in the county jail, rather than a
state prison. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170(h)(2)-(3). For commentary regarding the effects of this
initiative, see Emilie A. Whitehurst, Note, Shaping California’s Prisons: How the Alternative
Custody Program, Designed to Remedy the State’s Eighth Amendment Violations in the Prison
System, Encroaches on Equal Protection, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 321-29 (2012)
(arguing this initiative violates the Equal Protection Clause); Ken Strutin, The Realignment of
Incarcerative Punishment: Sentencing Reform and the Conditions of Confinement, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1313, 1338-39 (2012).
220
In the early 1800s, Congress authorized federal courts to designate facilities (including
state prisons, penitentiaries, and jails) for the execution of federal sentences. See 4 Stat. 118, sect.
15 (1825); 13 Stat. 500 (passed March 3, 1865); Cosgrove v. Smith, 697 F.2d 1125, 1135-36 (D.C.
1983) (tracing this history); Ex Parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. 396, 398-400 (1876) (detailing relevant
statutory provisions). During the Civil War, Congress continued this delegation to federal courts,
but also authorized the Secretary of the Interior, and then the Attorney General, to assign federal
prisoners to state prisons. Cosgrove, 697 F.2d at 1136. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that
Congress held this authority, Karstendick, 93 U.S. at 401, and recognized that authorizing courts
to select sites of confinement might allow for the fine-tuning of offenders’ punishments, see id. at
399. In particular, in Ex Parte Karstendick, the Court noted the varying severity of prisons’
disciplinary and treatment practices, and approved courts’ selection of a particular prison as a
means to “graduate” the severity of an offender’s sentence. Id. at 399. In 1941, Congress
216

45

HUMANE PUNISHMENT
*DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION
MAY 3, 2013

while prison officials should certainly possess broad discretion to run prisons in
the manner they see fit, 221 legislatures should recognize that certain conditions of
confinement may be necessary for the incarceration of some offenders with major
mental disorders to be humane. In addition to setting standards governing
correctional officials’ care and treatment of this population, 222 legislatures should
consider authorizing judges to identify particularly vulnerable offenders and to
structure these offenders’ prison sentences so that they will serve the intended
purposes of punishment. 223
In essence, when a judge believes that a seriously disordered offender
should be incarcerated for his crime—but that confinement under certain,
predictable conditions would render his punishment excessive, inhumane, or
otherwise inappropriate—the judge should be permitted to tailor the sentence so
that the offender’s actual experience will conform, as closely as possible, to that

eliminated courts’ ability to select an offender’s facility and transferred this power completely to
the Attorney General. See 55 Stat. 252 (1941) (amending 18 USC 753(f)). Currently, 18 U.S.C. §
3621(b) (2012) provides that “[t]he Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s
imprisonment.”
Of course, unless a legislature authorizes the judiciary to select the site of confinement, the
place the sentence is executed is not part of an offender’s sentence. See Aderhold v. Edwards 71
F.2d 297, 297-98 (5th Cir. 1934 ) (“The sentence in a criminal case fixes the term of punishment,
but the law provides for the place of imprisonment. . . . The place of confinement is not part of the
sentence.”); Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 451 (1892) (“[I]t is well settled that the time and
place of execution are not, strictly, part of the judgment of sentence, unless made so by statute.”).
221
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) (“Running a prison is an inordinately
difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of
which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.
Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those
branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”); Jones v.
North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (“Because the realities of
running a penal institution are complex and difficult, we have also recognized the wide-ranging
deference to be accorded the decisions of prison administrators.”).
222
See, e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2005) (calling
for study of sexual abuse in detention facilities and national standards to prevent, detect, and
respond to it); National Standards to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to Prison Rape, Docket No.
OAG–131 (signed May 16, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 115),
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_final_rule.pdf (establishing guidelines for the staffing of
detention facilities, the supervision and monitoring of inmates, the classification and housing of
inmates within a facility, the means of reporting sexual abuse, and the investigation of reports of
abuse); Angela A. Allen-Bell, Perception Profiling and Prolonged Solitary Confinement Viewed
Through the Lens of the Angola 3 Case: When Prison Officials Become Judges, Judges Become
Visually Challenged, and Justice Becomes Legally Blind, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 763, 820
n.296 (2012) (reviewing the efforts of several state legislatures to monitor and restrict the use of
solitary confinement, especially for offenders with mental illnesses).
223
See American Bar Association, Criminal Justice System, Project on Standards Relating to
the Legal Status of Prisoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 377, 408-09 (1977).
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intended by the judge at the moment of sentencing. Many conditions could be
useful to this end and would affect correctional affairs to varying degrees. This
Part will assess several possible sentence conditions, including the
disqualification or designation of particular facilities and treatment directives. In
modifying the carceral sentence of a seriously disordered offender, the goal of the
judge would be to mitigate the risks of serious harm that prison poses to the
offender, rendering the carceral sentence a humane and proportionate response to
the offender’s criminal act.
One important caveat is necessary to address at the forefront. Several of
the options below affect a prisoner’s housing. As referenced previously,
correctional agencies typically reach facility and housing placements through a
complex classification process. External classification assesses the level of risk
posed by an inmate and dictates the amount of supervision the inmate requires. 224
The risk evaluation considers an inmate’s offense, criminal history, past conduct
within correctional institutions, and socio-demographic factors (such as age,
history of mental illness, and gang affiliation), all of which bear a statistical
association with future prison conduct. 225 These risk factors determine an
individual’s custody level, which suggests the security level of the appropriate
facility for the inmate. 226 The ultimate facility selected, in addition to offering
adequate security, ideally should be capable of providing the treatment and
programming that an inmate requires to meet the agency’s constitutional
obligations and to satisfy the punishment goals for that inmate, such as reducing
recidivism. 227 Security and management considerations drive classification
decisions, 228 and at times an inmate’s classification can yield a placement without
necessary treatment modalities. 229 Most prisons allow for “overrides” to change

224

HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 57.
James Austin, External and Internal Classification, supra note 102, at 6; JAMES AUSTIN,
FINDINGS IN PRISON CLASSIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT 2-3, 5 (Nat’l Institute of Corrections
2003), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/018888.pdf.
226
HARDYMAN ET AL., PRISONER INTAKE SYSTEMS, supra note 22, at 57. For instance, a
medium custody offender should be confined in a medium security facility or in a facility with
medium security beds.
227
James Austin, External and Internal Classification, supra note 102, at 6 (“[Needs
classification] information is used to determine in which programs or special services the inmate
should be participate while incarcerated to enhance adjustment to the facility and to reduce the risk
of recidivism. When combined with the inmate’s custody level, it further refines the decisions
surrounding to which facility an inmate will be assigned.”).
228
Holton, supra note 90, at 105 (“[Inmate classification] decisions are typically and
primarily based on security or management aspects of behavior (e.g., assault history, escape risk)
rather than on clinical need.”).
229
Id. (observing that “some treatment modalities may not be available at all security levels,
so an inmate may be unable to receive optimal care due to his or her security rating”).
225
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the custody and security of an inmate to accommodate mental health or medical
conditions. 230 One clinical psychologist with experience working within several
prison systems observed, however, that the “override” mechanism is inadequate to
ensure the provision of clinical placements because “often the decision to apply
[the “override”] variable is made by a nonclinical staff member, or factors such as
the inmate’s criminal or disciplinary history are given more weight than the
inmate’s need for treatment.” 231 When a judge imposes conditions that affect a
defendant’s facility or housing placement, the judge should ensure that
correctional officials anticipate being able to satisfy these conditions without
unduly compromising the institution’s legitimate security needs. 232
A.
Authority to Disqualify Certain Facilities
One option to reduce a vulnerable offender’s risk of harm when
imprisoned would be to authorize judges to disqualify certain facilities as possible
sites of confinement. A judge may find a facility unacceptable for a particular
vulnerable, seriously disordered offender on a number of grounds, including the
facility’s thin mental health staffing, inadequate mental health services, 233 lack of
specialized housing for individuals with serious but non-acute mental disorders, 234
dearth of protective housing, high rates of violence, or overcrowding. A facility
may also be objectionable in light of its regular practice of disciplining or
protecting offenders through placement in isolation. 235 A 2004 report by the
National Institute of Corrections indicates that 47% of states treat offenders with
serious mental illnesses as eligible for the same punishments for disciplinary

230

Anderson, supra note 89, at 222.
Holton, supra note 90, at 105.
232
See American Bar Association, supra note 223, at 408-09 (proposing the following
standard of sentencing court oversight: “Judges should not sentence defendants to confinement
unless correctional authorities have certified in writing that facilities, programs, and personnel are
available to reasonably carry out the purpose and intent of each sentence.”).
233
See, e.g., BECK & MARUSCHAK, supra note 21, at 1-2, 5 (reporting the percentage of state
adult correctional facilities that provide 24-hour mental health care, therapy, and medication);
Ronald W. Manderscheid et al., Growth of Mental Health Services in State Correctional Facilities
1988 to 2000, 55 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 869, 871 (2004) (Table 1) (reporting the number and
percentage of adult correctional facilities that provide 24-hour mental health care, therapy, and
medication in each state).
234
See infra notes 246-268 (discussing intermediate care facilities).
235
Several courts have held that the prolonged isolation of offenders with serious mental
illnesses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at
178 & n.156.
231
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violations as standard offenders. 236 In addition, as previously discussed,
vulnerable inmates in many prisons are placed in protective custody in extremely
restrictive conditions, 237 which can cause acute psychological deterioration and
distress. 238 Many offenders with serious mental disorders are both vulnerable to
abuse and likely to experience difficulty complying with prison rules, 239 so
disqualifying facilities that respond to these foreseeable predicaments in ways that
expose inmates to serious risks of harm could serve as an important means to
excise those sources of harm most likely to render an offender’s sentence
disproportionate or inhumane. 240
This option has several practical limitations, however. While disqualifying
a facility for a given prisoner could, in theory, pose minimal difficulty for a
correctional agency, that outcome would depend on the number of available
facilities and the security levels present within each one. Also, disqualifying any
particular facility does not guarantee anything about where or how the offender
will actually be confined, so the capacity of this option to improve conditions of
confinement for seriously disordered offenders is questionable. Disqualifying
certain facilities could even result in greater hardship for a seriously disordered
offender if, for instance, he were placed in a facility farther away from his family
or support network as a result of this sentence condition.
B.
Authority to Designate Certain Facility
Alternatively, a legislature could grant the judicial branch the authority to
order that a vulnerable, seriously disordered offender serve his sentence—or at
least start his sentence 241—in a particular facility, such as one with certain mental
health, programming, or protective resources, assuming that the facility is capable

236

AUSTIN & MCGINNIS, supra note 41, at 37 (“In 47 percent of the responding states,
mentally ill inmates who are disruptive are subject to the same maximum-custody policies as all
other inmates.”).
237
See supra note 103.
238
See Johnston, Vulnerability, supra note 12, at 202 nn.257-59.
239
See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
240
Some states have taken a similar approach in the context of juvenile delinquents, allowing
their transfer to adult correctional facilities but prohibiting their confinement in certain prisons.
See IND. CODE § 11-10-2-10(a)(3) (1998) (authorizing the commissioner of corrections to transfer
a committed delinquent offender to an adult facility or program in certain circumstances, but
providing that “[n]o offender may be transferred to the Indiana state prison or the Pendleton
Correctional Facility”).
241
See text accompanying note 273, infra. Multiple considerations militate toward allowing
prison officials to transfer prisoners among facilities, such as prisoners’ evolving mental health
statuses, the need to protect prisoners from dangers within a particular facility, changes in
prisoners’ security classifications, and institutional priorities and resource needs.
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of managing an offender’s security risks. 242 For instance, a legislature could
establish that seriously disordered offenders who would face unacceptable levels
of hardship in a typical prison facility should serve their sentences in a
correctional facility capable of offering an appropriate therapeutic environment,
and then grant sentencing judges the authority to identify vulnerable individuals
and select available facilities that comply with this directive in a given case. Some
prisons, for instance, offer intermediate care facilities or residential treatment
units, which have been shown to “dramatically improve the quality of life” of
mentally ill inmates who have difficulty coping with the stresses of prison,
especially those who are vulnerable to predatory inmates in the general prison
population or who struggle with medication compliance. 243 While ordering the
confinement of a vulnerable, seriously disordered offender in a facility with
certain treatment or protective resources would not guarantee access to those
services for the duration of an offender’s sentence, 244 residence may increase the
likelihood of an offender’s receipt of those resources if the need arises, as long as
they are available at the offender’s security level. 245
1.
Intermediate Care Facilities
While commentators have almost universally characterized prison as a
toxic environment for individuals with serious mental illnesses, 246 an exception
exists for those individuals housed in intermediate care facilities, also known as
residential treatment units. Intermediate care facilities, which exist in a slowly
increasing number of states, 247 are designed to provide a stable and therapeutic
environment for mentally ill prisoners 248 who are unable to cope effectively in the

242

See supra notes 224-232 and accompanying text.
Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates with Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 401, 465 (1992).
244
Intermediate care “facilities” are often units within larger facilities. See infra note 252.
245
See Holton, supra note 90, at 105 (observing that “some treatment modalities may not be
available at all security levels, so an inmate may be unable to receive optimal care due to his or her
security rating”).
246
See supra note 137.
247
See supra notes 117-128.
248
Many intermediate care programs focus on treating prisoners with severe mental illnesses.
See, e.g., David Lovell et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of Residential Treatment for Prisoners
with Mental Illness, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 83, 86 (2001); OHIO DRC, supra note 119, at 2.
Inmates with less serious disorders but with significant coping problems are also eligible in some
states. OHIO DRC, supra note 119, at 2; Ward S. Condelli et al., Intermediate Care Programs for
Inmates with Psychiatry Disorders, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 63, 67 (1994) (Table
2) (listing psychiatric diagnoses of inmates in intermediate care programs).
243
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general prison population but do not require hospital-level care. 249 Modeled on
the “therapeutic community” and “therapeutic milieu” concepts advanced by
Hans Toch and his colleagues, 250 intermediate care facilities provide inmates with
a therapeutic environment that reduces the stressors and conditions that cause
psychological degeneration and threaten victimization. As described by Professor
David Lovell, these programs “operate on the premise that, like some other
disabilities, mental illness may not be curable, but persons with mental illness can
cope with the disability if provided with effective clinical care and equipped with
the needed understanding and skills.” 251 Within these units or facilities, 252 many
treatment modalities and programming options are typically available. 253
Prisoners, through individual or group therapy, may learn symptom recognition,
anger management, medical compliance strategies, communication techniques,
and vocational skills. 254 Rates of medication compliance are high as a result of
patient education, symptom management, frequent psychiatric consultations, and

249

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 130; CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW
YORK, supra note 90, at 35; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 109, at 2; OHIO
DRC, supra note 119, at 2; WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 118, at 3.
250
See generally THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITIES IN CORRECTIONS (Hans Toch, ed. 1984).
251
Lovell et al., supra note 248, at 86.
252
Intermediate care facilities may reside within a separate correctional mental health facility
or in separate wards or units within individual prisons. For example, New York operates
intermediate beds within eleven of its maximum security prisons. CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 35 (stating that each residential treatment unit has its own cellblock
with separate areas of programming and recreation and characterizing these units as “islands of
compassionate care in the stressful and sometimes violent world of maximum-security prisons”).
Washington provides residential treatment in three facilities, including the McNeil State Prison.
WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 118, at 4. Kansas maintains a separate
mental health facility. See LARNED CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH FACILITY, supra note 122.
Security levels vary amongst institutions, and even within a single program. See, e.g., OHIO DRC,
supra note 119, at 4-5 (providing a summary of the treatment, housing, and therapy offered at the
four levels of its intermediate care program); VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra
note 125, at 2 (offering a secure residential treatment program for the psychiatric treatment of
inmates with close custody needs and an intermediate residential treatment program whose goal is
to “provide transitional mental health care to . . . prepare [inmates] for successful reintegration into
the general inmate population”); Kupers et al., supra note 124, at 1042 (describing Mississippi’s
program, which divides its inmates into two blocks, one upper level where inmates are segregated,
but receive intensive treatment and therapy, and one lower level open unit, resembling the general
population).
253
See, e.g., CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 35; Lovell et al.,
supra note 248, at 86; Kupers et al., supra note 124, at 1042-43; Condelli et al., supra note 248, at
64.
254
See, e.g., CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 35; Lovell et al.,
supra note 248, at 86; Kupers et al., supra note 124, at 1042-42; MacKain & Messer, supra note
120, at 92, 96.
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the increased privacy and decreased stigma afforded to receipt of psychotropic
medication in these units. 255 Much like a halfway house or community care center
outside prison, these units are intended as short- or mid-term safe-havens where
inmates learn strategies for living in the larger “community,” or the general prison
population. 256 While programs encourage re-entry to the general population, some
administrators allow inmates to remain in residential treatment units if re-entry is
not feasible given an inmate’s risk of victimization, self-harm, or medication
noncompliance. 257
Multiple studies demonstrate that treatment in intermediate care facilities
results in lower levels of mental disorder, disciplinary violations, and
victimization, and may yield aggregate cost savings for prisons. 258 A study by
Lovell and his colleagues of the McNeil program in Washington reported:
Inmates were significantly more stable in terms of psychiatric
symptoms when they left than when they arrived. Inmates had
better infraction records and consumed less of the department’s
management resources, . . . and were able to maintain themselves
in [the] general population setting. 259

255

See CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 36 (reporting that 95%
of inmates in intermediate care programs (ICPs) said that they take their mediation regularly and
75% said it was “easier to take medication in the ICP”).
256
See, e.g., Kupers et al., supra note 124, at 1042; VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, supra note 125, at 2 (“[The] programs are designed to . . . prepar[e] for and
enhanc[e] productive participation in Departmental programs and activities in the general
population”); CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 37; WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 118, at 3.
257
Intermediate care programs vary in duration. In Washington, , inmates spend a median of
seven months in the McNeil mental health program. Lovell et al., supra note 248, at 88. Prison
rules specify that prisoners may stay a maximum of eighteen months, but staff allow some inmates
to stay longer if they believe no other situation is suitable. Id. In Mississippi, the average stay is
three to six months. Kupers et al., supra note 124, at 1043. In New York, inmates may stay in
intermediate care programs for years, and “many” never leave. CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 38; see Condelli et al., supra note 248, at 65. In North Carolina,
most offenders complete the Social Skills Training Day Program in six to eight months, but
offenders may remain in the program indefinitely if they are “not yet ready for transfer to a less
restrictive environment.” MacKain & Messer, supra note 120, at 94.
258
See MacKain & Messer, supra note 120, at 91-92 (describing studies).
259
Lovell et al., supra note 248, at 100. That study measured the number of disciplinary
infractions that program participants received before and after completion, and related that figure
to a cost index. Id. at 90.
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The study also found that inmates consumed fewer prison resources after
completing the McNeil program. 260
Other studies have reached similar conclusions. A 2004 report by the New
York Correctional Association found that the intermediate care programs in that
state function successfully as a safe haven for mentally ill prisoners. 261 A survey
of intermediate care program inmates revealed that 50% of inmates had been
victimized before entering the program, 262 and 57% of inmates did not feel safe in
the general population. 263 A majority of inmates indicated that the intermediate
care program successfully protects them from aggressive inmates, and 89% of
surveyed inmates articulated a desire to remain in the program for the duration of
their prison sentences. 264 The rate of inmates’ disciplinary infractions also
dropped significantly while in the program. 265 An earlier study in New York
found significant reductions in mental health services received by program
inmates, including crisis care, seclusion, and hospitalization.266 Finally, a study by
Terry Kupers and his colleagues of the “step-down” unit in Mississippi’s
converted super-maximum security prison, Unit 32, found that rates of
disciplinary infractions dropped significantly when inmates entered the step-down
program (as compared to rates six months prior to entry) and remained depressed
six months after the program’s completion. 267 The study concluded: “[I]t is
obvious to custody and staff that participation in the step-down unit has helped to
keep this group out of trouble.” 268 Other social scientists have speculated that
intermediate care programs may help disordered inmates “generalize the skills

260

Id. at 96 (Table 4). The finding that intermediate care facilities may convey cost savings
might be counterintuitive, since these units typically require more mental health professionals,
nurses and counselors per inmate than units in the general population. See, e.g., ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 126, at 4 (listing members of an inmate’s treatment
team).
261
CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 37-38.
262
Id. at 37 (this figure includes both property offenses and physical victimization).
263
Id.
264
Id.
265
Id. at 38-39; cf. Condelli et al., supra note 248, at 67 (reporting significant reductions in
very serious infractions and suicide attempts but not in merely serious infractions, during the six
months after admission to the intermediate care program).
266
Condelli et al., supra note 248, at 68.
267
Kupers et al., supra note 124, at 1046 (finding that prisoners averaged 4.7 rules violations
in the six months before they entered the program, 1.2 violations while in the step-down unit, and
0.6 violations in the six months after the completion of the program).
268
Id. at 1046.
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they will need post-release and, therefore, offer promise in reducing stress and
cost in a larger sphere of mental health treatment.” 269
2.
Benefits of Initial Facility Designation
These studies suggest that intermediate care facilities and residential
treatment units offer a humane and affordable 270 means of confining vulnerable
offenders with serious mental illnesses. Governors should allocate funding for
expanding these facilities, and legislatures should consider authorizing judges—
when they find that an offender with a serious mental illness would be unable to
cope effectively or would be particularly prone to victimization in the general
prison population—to sentence an offender to confinement in a facility with
residential treatment units, assuming that such a facility is consistent with an
offender’s security and management needs. While laws in every jurisdiction
provide for the treatment of prisoners with serious mental disorders, 271
correctional authorities may be unlikely to transfer an offender to a specialized
correctional facility or mental hospital until an offender is in acute distress.
Authorizing judges to sentence vulnerable, seriously disordered offenders to
facilities with intermediate care services should increase the likelihood that
correctional officials will move these offenders to those units if the offenders
prove unable to cope effectively in the general population. 272 In essence, it is
easier to move an offender within a facility than between facilities, and authorities
may be more likely to view intermediate care as a viable option when it is
available in the facility in which an inmate resides.
Another option would be to authorize judges to order an offender
presumptively to begin his sentence in a particular unit within a given facility,
again so long as that placement is consistent with an offender’s security needs.
Permitting a judge to order that a vulnerable, seriously disordered offender start
his carceral term in a residential treatment unit, for instance, would ensure that the
offender would receive a comprehensive evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment
plan. In addition, residing in an intermediate care facility for a few months would
allow an offender to acclimate to any newly administered psychotropic
medication, receive greater monitoring of his medication, benefit from individual
and group therapy, and develop skills and strategies for living in the general
prison population, such as symptom recognition, anger management, medical
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MacKain & Messer, supra note 120, at 89.
See supra note 259-260 and accompanying text.
271
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, ARTI RAI & RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 640 (5th ed. 2009).
272
While this statement is intuitive, empirical research is necessary to verify its accuracy.
270
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compliance, and interpersonal skills. 273 The individual would thus be better
equipped, when (and if) he is transferred out of the unit, to cope successfully in
the general population. The individual might also be less likely to fall through the
cracks of the prison’s mental health care docket if his mental health later
deteriorates. Because this would be a presumptive placement, the offender could
begin his term in another unit if, in the opinion of a qualified mental health
professional, another prison environment could satisfy an offender’s treatment
and protective needs. 274 To ensure that the presumption has teeth, the judge could
require that correctional officials provide a written explanation for any alternative
placement.
3.
Objections
While this option may result in a higher level of mental health care and a
more protective and therapeutic environment for a vulnerable, seriously
disordered offender, valid objections could be raised against allowing judges to
tailor an offender’s sentence in this way. Most obviously, placing individuals first
in line for residential treatment slots may result in inequity and a misallocation of
resources, as correctional officials would be unable to assign the neediest and
most vulnerable offenders to these units. It also may result in designated offenders
receiving more costly housing (through service provision or intensive mental
health staffing) than is necessary given their current mental health statuses.
However, treating a judge’s housing placement as rebuttable may respond
adequately to these concerns.
Other objections may be harder to diffuse. Allowing judges to make
facility designations would impede correctional authorities’ abilities to forecast
prison housing and resource needs. Given the number of offenders with serious
mental illnesses entering the prison system, 275 allowing judges to order a subset of
these offenders to begin their sentences in residential treatment units might
require an expansion of those units. 276 Furthermore, this option would provide
only temporary relief to vulnerable, seriously disordered offenders, since
correctional officials would be free to transfer the inmates out of these therapeutic
environments after some period of time. 277 As an alternative, a legislature could
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Over a third of inmates in North Carolina’s Social Skills Day Training Program arrive
directly after entering the prison system. See MacKain & Messer, supra note 120, at 93, 96.
274
See supra note 188.
275
See supra note 1.
276
Many mental health experts, organizations, and advocates urge states to expand the
number and capacities of intermediate care facilities. See, e.g., CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
NEW YORK, supra note 90, at 40; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 133-34; Holton,
supra note 90, at 116.
277
See supra note 257 (discussing the average length of stay in intermediate care facilities).
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consider authorizing judges to order that vulnerable, seriously disordered
offenders preemptively spend the entirety of their carceral terms in such
protective, therapeutic units, at least in states where such a long-term option
exists.278
C.
Authority to Mandate Certain Treatment Consequences
Alternatively, a legislature could authorize a judge to attach certain
treatment conditions to the carceral sentences of vulnerable, seriously disordered
individuals. 279 In this situation, correctional authorities would retain the ultimate
housing decision, but qualifications would govern their treatment of an offender.
As with housing stipulations, a judge may want to receive certification from
correctional officials that they are able to satisfy a set of conditions before issuing
a sentence. 280 A number of conditions are possible. For instance, a judge could
order that, assuming an offender’s mental health problems merit treatment, 281 the
offender receive an individualized treatment plan within a designated period of
time and treatment in accordance with that plan, plus additional treatment as
necessary, over the course of his confinement. The court could require periodic
assessments of the nature and extent of the defendant’s mental illness and updates
regarding the offender’s mental health, his housing, and the treatment afforded to
him. 282

278

But see supra note 241 (listing considerations supporting correctional officials’ abilities to
transfer inmates among facilities). Future work will assess whether states should segregate all
offenders with serious mental illnesses —or only the subset who are particularly vulnerable to
serious harm if incarcerated with the general prison population—in designated facilities, as some
correctional institutions do for other vulnerable groups, such as gay, trans-women, elderly, and
juvenile offenders.
279
See American Bar Association, supra note 223, at 408-09. Some statutes allow judges to
secure commitments from correctional authorities regarding conditions of confinement in the
context of proceedings involving juveniles. See, e.g., Michigan MCR 5.956 (1998) (authorizing a
judge, in response to a juvenile offender’s violation of probation under an order of disposition
delaying imposition of sentence, to order a range of sanctions including incarceration for up to 30
days so long as “the present county jail facility would meet all requirements under federal law and
regulations for housing juveniles and . . . the court has consulted with the sheriff to determine
when the sentence will begin to ensure that space will be available for the juvenile” and specifying
that, “[i]f the juvenile is under seventeen (17) years of age, the juvenile must be placed in a room
or ward out of sight and sound from adult prisoners; other participation or performance as the
court considers necessary”).
280
See supra note 279.
281
This determination would ultimately reside with the mental health professional available to
assess and treat the inmate inside the prison. See supra note 188.
282
In this way, sentencing conditions could mimic the requirements of some guilty but
mentally ill statutes. See, e.g., 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6 (“If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment
upon a defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill, the defendant shall be committed to
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In an attempt to mitigate the risk of serious harm that imprisonment poses
to a seriously disordered offender, a judge may wish to add other conditions to his
sentencing order. For instance, a judge may want to direct correctional officials to
consider the offender’s mental disorder, and its possible contribution to a
disciplinary violation, in any future disciplinary proceedings. 283 A judge could
order that, in imposing sanctions for future rules violations, officials use their best
efforts to avoid imposing sanctions, such as prolonged isolation, known to
exacerbate the offender’s disorder. 284 In addition, the sentencing order could
provide that, if solitary confinement is deemed absolutely necessary as a security
measure, correctional authorities must isolate the offender under conditions
outlined by the American Psychiatric Association, which include standards for
provision of care, regular assessment by qualified mental health professionals, and
removal from segregation of inmates in current, severe psychiatric crisis. 285 A
judge could also order that, if an inmate needs to be removed from the general
population for his protection, he should be housed in an environment meeting
certain programming, treatment, and socialization thresholds in order to preserve
the inmate’s mental health.
These conditions could be enforced in various ways. Depending on a
state’s resentencing statute, an offender may be able to move for sentence
modification when correctional authorities fail to satisfy a condition of his

the Department of Corrections, which shall cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made
concerning the nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness. The
Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other counseling and
treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary.”).
283
For example, a judge could mandate that a clinician review any disciplinary reports to
discern whether mental disorder contributed to the infraction. Cf. Ball, supra note 39, at 38-39
(noting that, in California, a clinician must review the disciplinary report of every prisoner
receiving mental health treatment to determine whether the prisoner’s mental disorder contributed
to the infraction); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 29, at 26 (“It is especially
important to have clinical input when decisions are made about an inmate who is receiving mental
health care regarding disciplinary issues, work and housing assignments, and transfers in and out
of the institution.”). Prisons vary in the extent to which they consider mental disorder in
disciplinary proceedings. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 33, at 62-64; Michael Krelstein,
The Role of Mental Health in the Inmate Disciplinary Process: A National Survey, 30 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 488, 494 (2002), available at http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/reprint/30/4/488.
284
See supra note 95-96 and accompanying text.
285
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 29, at 5; see also Cohen & Dvoskin,
supra note 243, at 470 (recommending at least two hours each day of on-site mental health
professional staff in an isolation unit); see also Fellner, Corrections Quandary, supra note 39, at
411 (“Most importantly, corrections officials must develop options for responding to dangerous or
disruptive individuals who are mentally ill other than simply putting them into segregation. If such
individuals require extensive security precautions, they should be housed in specialized secure
units where they can participate in purposeful activities, have human interaction, and receive the
services that mental health professionals deem therapeutically appropriate.”).
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sentence. 286 Alternatively, the legislature could authorize judges to exercise
continuing jurisdiction over the sentences of particularly vulnerable offenders
with serious mental illnesses, much as judges do over probationers or children and
incompetent persons in guardianship proceedings. 287
VII.

Conclusion
At sentencing, a judge can often foresee that an individual, given his major
mental disorder and other vulnerabilities, will experience serious psychological or
physical harm in prison. These harms may include psychological deterioration
and mental distress, attempted suicide, and victimization by staff or other inmates.
In an attempt to reduce the disproportionate effect of incarceration on vulnerable
individuals, many jurisdictions designate extreme offender hardship as a
mitigating factor for use at sentencing. In these jurisdictions, vulnerability to harm
may militate toward an order of probation or a reduced term of confinement.
These measures, while salutary, do not go far enough to protect vulnerable
offenders who must serve time in prison, however. To ensure that sentences are
humane, proportionate, and appropriate to effectuate the intended aims of
punishment, legislatures should authorize judges to tailor the conditions of
vulnerable, disordered offenders’ sentences. Sentencing conditions could include
ensuring that offenders receive timely and periodic evaluations by qualified
mental health professionals, disqualifying facilities with insufficient mental health
or protective resources, specifying the facility or unit where an offender will serve
or begin his sentence, or mandating certain treatment in prison. By conditioning
vulnerable, disordered offenders’ sentences in these ways, judges will be better
equipped to individualize offenders’ sentences so that sentences both reflect
offenders’ deserved punishment and avoid cruelty that cannot be condoned by a
civilized system of justice.
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See Schlabach v. State, 37 So.3d 230, 237 (Fla. 2010) (observing with approval judge’s
decision to grant a sentence modification where the presence of a substance abuse program was a
factor in the judge’s original sentence and was not made available to the offender).
287
See American Bar Association, supra note 223, at 584 (“The sentencing court should have
a continuing responsibility to insure that its sentence is appropriately carried out. . . . The exercise
of continuous jurisdiction by the sentencing court is not a stark departure from analogous areas. In
guardianship cases, courts often exercise responsibility through appointed agents over children and
incompetents. And, even in the criminal area, a sentence to probation is presently subject to
continuous review by a sentencing court.”).

